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OverviewPolitical meritocracy, which selects and promotes officials based on their work performance, is an important explanation for China's rapid development. While prior studies focus on territorial leaders (kuai), less attention is given to functional department leaders (tiao), whose performance is harder to measure, attribute, or compare. This Element introduces an attention-based explanation, arguing that in China's complex bureaucratic system, marked by intricate divisions of labor and information asymmetry, capturing superiors' attention is critical for official's career advancement. Through case studies and analyses of original biographical data on functional department leaders, this Element reveals: 1) Promotion likelihood correlates with officials' ability to gain superiors' attention; 2) Not all attention-seeking behaviors align with governance goals, often fostering bureaucratic issues like formalism and over-implementation. This attention-based framework tries to reconcile debates on competence versus connections in Chinese political selection and explains both the bureaucratic system's successes and its governance challenges. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Xiao Ma (Peking University)Publisher: Cambridge University Press Imprint: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 9781009502719ISBN 10: 1009502719 Pages: 75 Publication Date: 31 July 2026 Audience: General/trade , General Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Forthcoming Availability: Not yet available, will be POD This item is yet to be released. You can pre-order this item and we will dispatch it to you upon it's release. This is a print on demand item which is still yet to be released. Table of Contents1. Introduction; 2. Political meritocracy and an attention-based alternative approach; 3. Attention and promotion; 4. Attention and bureaucratic pathologies; 5. Conclusion and discussion; Acknowledgement; References.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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