Overview

Negligent or inadvertent action in both law and ethics is a matter of agency. The pre-theoretical and philosophical views agree that we are responsible for things that we do intentionally, but it is less clear whether we are responsible for inadvertent or negligent actions. The law of negligence in tort law attributes responsibility for inadvertent acts, while in ethics there is deep and serious scepticism about the responsibility for negligent or inadvertent action. How can we be responsible for things that happen beyond the realm of our knowledge or control? Positioned at the intersection of law and ethics, Responsibility for Negligence in Ethics and Law: Aspiration, Perspective and Civic Maturity responds to these fundamental questions by advancing the idea that the underpinning feature of negligent or inadvertent acts is the phenomenon of akrasia - the lack of integration of character and intelligent thinking. When we act akratically, we are acting contrary to our deliberated intention, due to an uneven development of character and thoughts about what is right, dutiful, and good. Using an Aristotelian-inspired model of deliberation, the book illustrates how legal decisions in negligence invite citizens to adopt a deliberative-aspirational perspective. This perspective encourages them to reshape, redescribe, and rethink their duties of care to meet the aspirational standard of the reasonable person. Consequently, the book argues that the purpose of negligence law is to promote values of citizen engagement and civic maturity. Combining tort law theory, Aristotelian conceptions of deliberation, and theories of practical rationality, responsibility, and action, this book invites us to rethink private law's purpose and methodology.

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9780198948186

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Verónica Rodríguez-Blanco is a Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy (Jurisprudence) at the University of Surrey Centre for Law and Philosophy, UK. She studied law and legal philosophy at Oxford University (MJur) and the University of Cambridge (PhD). She is the author of numerous articles, co-editor of Agency, Negligence and Responsibility (CUP, 2021), Dignity in the Legal and Political Philosophy of Ronald Dworkin (OUP, 2018), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency (CUP, 2015) and has written the monograph Law and Authority Under the Guise of the Good (Bloomsbury/Hart, 2017). She has been awarded fellowships and grants from the British Academy, Max Planck Institute, the Alexander Von Humboldt Foundation, the European University Institute, Cambridge Overseas Trust and the British Council. She is co-editor of the journal Jurisprudence.

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