Overview

Why do some countries succeed while others struggle? Why are some firms profitable while rivals fail? Why do some marriages thrive and others end in divorce? These questions seem unrelated, but societies, companies, and marriages have one important thing in common: they involve more than one individual. They thus face the same fundamental challenges. How can people be made to help rather than hurt each other? How can they use sacrifice, cooperation, and coercion to promote the common good? In this introductory text, Tore Ellingsen equips readers to answer essential questions around the success and failure of humans in groups, drawing on behavioral game theory, psychology, and sociology. He emphasizes how other-regarding preferences such as altruism and dutifulness matter for societies’ prosperity, and analyzes the role of culture in the form of shared values and understandings. One lesson is that cooperation is facilitated when people anticipate that they will hold common memories of past behavior, especially if agreements take precedence over leaders’ authority. A groundbreaking text, Institutional and Organizational Economics is essential reading for students and scholars of economics, political science, sociology, and public administration.

Full Product Details

Author:   Tore Ellingsen
Publisher:   John Wiley and Sons Ltd
Imprint:   Polity Press
Dimensions:   Width: 13.70cm , Height: 1.80cm , Length: 21.60cm
Weight:   0.295kg
ISBN:  

9781509559008

ISBN 10:   1509559000
Pages:   240
Publication Date:   06 October 2023
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   In stock  
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Table of Contents

Preface 1 The Organizational Challenge 2 Sacrifice 3 Selfishness, Rationality, and Utility 4 Situations, Games, and Cooperation 5 Shared Understandings and Values 6 Predicting Behavior in Games 7 A Model of Anarchy 8 Changing the Game 9 Coordination 10 Authority’s Limitations 11 Relationships 12 Third-party Punishment 13 Coercion: Costs and Benefits 14 Contracts and Governance 15 Limited Liability and Corporate Finance 16 Asymmetric Information 17 Application: The Oil-Pool Problem 18 Conclusion 19 More Food for Thought 20 Further Reading Postface Answers to Exercises Notes References Index

Reviews

“Institutional and Organizational Economics not only provides a superb development of the ideas of organizational economics, using the tools of basic game theory, but also offers fascinating connections to history, sociology, and literature. A tour de force.” Oliver D. Hart, Harvard University “This slim volume offers an amazing wealth of ideas about institutions and organizations. The exposition nicely combines historical and experimental evidence with clear and simple behavioral game theoretic explanations. A book to instruct and delight students and scholars alike.” Avinash Dixit, Princeton University

Author Information

Tore Ellingsen is the Ragnar Söderberg Chair in Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics.

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