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OverviewThis work focuses on constitutional amendments in divided societies. It analyzes and compares the ways in which constitutional amendment procedures are organized in states with significant linguistic, national or cultural cleavages. To explore this issue, we mobilize the theoretical framework of consociational federalism. The latter is a particular form of federalism that takes shape in accordance with the teachings and values of consociationalism (or consociational democracy). Consociational federalism is particularly relevant to study constitutional amendment procedures in divided societies, since it recommends a set of institutional arrangements and normative proposals designed to facilitate the achievement and maintenance of political stability in states marked by significant cleavages. Using a comparative approach, we study the constitutional amendment procedures in place in Belgium, Canada and Switzerland, while drawing on a number of other systems Full Product DetailsAuthor: Alain Gagnon , Dave GuénettePublisher: Peter Lang AG, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Imprint: Peter Lang AG, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Edition: New edition Volume: 34 Weight: 0.442kg ISBN: 9783034348379ISBN 10: 3034348371 Pages: 340 Publication Date: 11 June 2025 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand ![]() We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of ContentsAcknowledgements - Foreword - Introduction - Consociational Federalism as a Lens for Studying Constitutional Amendments in Divided Societies - Constitutional Amendments by Divided Political Elites - Elite Cohesion: Centralized Constitutional Amendment Processes - 1. The Grand Political Coalition and its Consociational Influence - 2. The Federal Parliament, Qualified Majorities and the Gathering of Representative Elites - Elite Autonomy: Decentralized Constitutional Amendment Processes - 3. The Ratification of Constitutional Amendments by Member States and the Asymmetrical Options - 4. Constitutional Initiative and Subnational Constitutionalism by Member States - Constitutional Amendments by a Divided People - Consulting the People: When Citizens Vote on Constitutional Amendments - 5. Indirect Consultation of Citizens: Parliamentary Dissolution and Elections During Constitutional Amendments - 6. Direct Consultation of Citizens: the Political and Legal Consequences of Referendums - Defining the Terms of Referendums: Drafting and Adopting Amendments - 7. Initiating a Constitutional Referendum and Drafting its Content - 8. Qualified Majorities and Greater Popular Consensus on Amendments - ConclusionReviewsAuthor InformationDave Guénette is Assistant Professor at the Université de Sherbrooke’s Faculty of Law. His work focuses on Canadian and comparative federalism, consociational democracy, and constitutional amendments in divided or multinational societies. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |