Overview

The concept of identity has been seen to lead to paradox: we cannot truly and usefully say that a thing is the same either as itself or as something else. This book is a full examination of this paradox in philosophical logic, and of its implications for the philosophy of mathematics, the philosphy of mind, and relativism about identity. The author's account involves detailed discussion of the views of Wittgenstein, Russell, Frege, and Hintikka.

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9780198248088

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<br> This book is clearly written by an author who is both technically and historically adept: the result is a first-rate treatment of a deep, difficult philosophical issue. --Choice<br> There is a wealth of material here for the logician concerned with the choice of a symbolism but also for the philosopher who is interested in the constitution of the self, in scientific statements of identity, or in the nature of mathematical knowledge. Williams is exact and careful in his demonstrations of what a given notation can and cannot do, and his criticisms of influential positions, though brief and schematic, are direct and provocative. The Review of Metaphysics<br>

This book is clearly written by an author who is both technically and historically adept: the result is a first-rate treatment of a deep, difficult philosophical issue. --Choice<br> There is a wealth of material here for the logician concerned with the choice of a symbolism but also for the philosopher who is interested in the constitution of the self, in scientific statements of identity, or in the nature of mathematical knowledge. Williams is exact and careful in his demonstrations of what a given notation can and cannot do, and his criticisms of influential positions, though brief and schematic, are direct and provocative. The Review of Metaphysics<br>

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