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OverviewFull Product DetailsAuthor: Joseph G. MorganPublisher: Lexington Books Imprint: Lexington Books Dimensions: Width: 16.20cm , Height: 2.40cm , Length: 23.80cm Weight: 0.513kg ISBN: 9781498576512ISBN 10: 1498576516 Pages: 252 Publication Date: 15 January 2021 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand ![]() We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of ContentsChapter One: “Diem Is a Keen Person,” 1919-1954 Chapter Two: “I’ve Never Seen a Situation like This,” 1954-1955 Chapter Three: “Wesley, in a Sense, Has Not Been Able to Produce,” 1956-1958 Chapter Four: “A Clumsy, Bumbling Regime,” 1958-1963 Chapter Five: “There Is Really No Other Choice but to Stand and Fight,” 1964-1966 Chapter Six: The “Biggest Operator of them all,” 1966-1968 Chapter Seven: “Off AID, Off CIA and Wesley Fishel,” 1969-1970 Chapter Eight: “A Great, and Tragic, American Experiment,” 1970-1977ReviewsJoseph Morgan's welcome biography of Wesley Fishel makes several important contributions to the literature on the Vietnam War. It expands upon and clarifies the activities of a sometimes controversial and often little-understood player in U.S. relations with Ngo Dinh Diem and the government in Saigon. More broadly, it captures in this one man's story the early enthusiasm and eventual frustration that colored America's national engagement with South Vietnam over two decades. As a final bonus, it gives valuable insights into the troubled role often played by American academics in support of Washington's Cold War policies. -- David L. Anderson, professor emeritus, California State University Joseph Morgan’s welcome biography of Wesley Fishel makes several important contributions to the literature on the Vietnam War. It expands upon and clarifies the activities of a sometimes controversial and often little-understood player in U.S. relations with Ngo Dinh Diem and the government in Saigon. More broadly, it captures in this one man’s story the early enthusiasm and eventual frustration that colored America’s national engagement with South Vietnam over two decades. As a final bonus, it gives valuable insights into the troubled role often played by American academics in support of Washington’s Cold War policies. -- David L. Anderson, professor emeritus, California State University Author InformationJoseph G. Morgan is associate professor of history at Iona College. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |