Overview

How autocracy flourished even as the economy failed in VenezuelaAn alarming number of countries that once were seemingly stable democracies have veered in recent years toward authoritarianism—a trend known as “democratic backsliding.” One of those countries in Venezuela, which enjoyed periods of democratically elected governments in the latter half of the twentieth century but in the past two decades has increasingly descended into autocratic rule, coupled with economic collapse. Venezuela's Transition to Authoritarianism, written by a veteran scholar of Venezuela and Latin American politics generally explores how and why this happened. Corrales argues that Venezuela's slide began with the policies of former president Hugo Chávez—policies that were based on government control of the economy and in turn generated a lingering economic crisis. After he succeeded Chávez in 2013, Nicolás Maduro not only entrenched the failed economic policies but also responded to various crises by establishing institutions that further undermined democracy. Each of Maduro's responses may have solved a short-term problem but collectively they destroyed both any pretense of democracy in Venezuela and prospects for his own long-term success. Corrales analyzes the lingering crisis in Venezuela by comparing it to twenty cases in Latin America where presidents were forced out of office. Regardless of how the current situation ends in Venezuela, His book illuminates the depressing cycle in which semi-authoritarian regimes become increasingly autocratic in response to crises, only to cause new crises that led to even greater authoritarianism.

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"A worthy sequel to Corrales's earlier classic Dragon in the Tropics, Autocracy Rising rigorously examines the paradox of the perseverance of the Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro in the midst of economic collapse and severe international sanctions. Corrales offers three compelling explanations for Maduro's survival: asymmetric party system fragmentation, wherein the strength of the ruling party (rooted in deep networks of clientelism and cronyism) eclipses a fragmented opposition; institutional destruction and colonization, with the state exercising tremendous control over the electoral authorities, the coercive apparatus, and the courts (what Corrales labels 'autocratic legalism'); and, most originally, institutional innovation ('functional fusion') in which institutions begin to multitask. The military acquires business functions, a constituent assembly becomes a legislature, local political councils become food distribution networks, and criminal syndicates acquire some of the functions of the state. In addition, Corrales provides valuable comparative case studies: Nicaragua offers a similar story of ascendant authoritarianism, but Colombia and Ecuador suggest that liberal democracy can fight back. Somewhat surprisingly, Corrales concludes that Maduro's rule remains tenuous, well short of true autocratic consolidation.-- ""Foreign Affairs"" In this empirically and theoretically important book, Corrales explains Venezuela's transition to full authoritarianism under Nicolás Maduro. This transition seems surprising because the multiple crises the semi-authoritarian regime faced by the mid-2010s might well have caused its collapse instead. Corrales anchors his explanation on two key variables, both broadly useful for comparative analysis....This is a pathbreaking work based on a comprehensive literature and is both definitive on the case of Venezuela and innovative for broader analysis of democratic backsliding. Highly recommended. Advanced undergraduates through faculty; professionals.-- ""Choice Reviews"""

A worthy sequel to Corrales's earlier classic Dragon in the Tropics, Autocracy Rising rigorously examines the paradox of the perseverance of the Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro in the midst of economic collapse and severe international sanctions. Corrales offers three compelling explanations for Maduro's survival: asymmetric party system fragmentation, wherein the strength of the ruling party (rooted in deep networks of clientelism and cronyism) eclipses a fragmented opposition; institutional destruction and colonization, with the state exercising tremendous control over the electoral authorities, the coercive apparatus, and the courts (what Corrales labels 'autocratic legalism'); and, most originally, institutional innovation ('functional fusion') in which institutions begin to multitask. The military acquires business functions, a constituent assembly becomes a legislature, local political councils become food distribution networks, and criminal syndicates acquire some of the functions of the state. In addition, Corrales provides valuable comparative case studies: Nicaragua offers a similar story of ascendant authoritarianism, but Colombia and Ecuador suggest that liberal democracy can fight back. Somewhat surprisingly, Corrales concludes that Maduro's rule remains tenuous, well short of true autocratic consolidation. In this empirically and theoretically important book, Corrales explains Venezuela's transition to full authoritarianism under Nicolás Maduro. This transition seems surprising because the multiple crises the semi-authoritarian regime faced by the mid-2010s might well have caused its collapse instead. Corrales anchors his explanation on two key variables, both broadly useful for comparative analysis....This is a pathbreaking work based on a comprehensive literature and is both definitive on the case of Venezuela and innovative for broader analysis of democratic backsliding. Highly recommended. Advanced undergraduates through faculty; professionals.

A worthy sequel to Corrales's earlier classic Dragon in the Tropics, Autocracy Rising rigorously examines the paradox of the perseverance of the Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro in the midst of economic collapse and severe international sanctions. Corrales offers three compelling explanations for Maduro's survival: asymmetric party system fragmentation, wherein the strength of the ruling party (rooted in deep networks of clientelism and cronyism) eclipses a fragmented opposition; institutional destruction and colonization, with the state exercising tremendous control over the electoral authorities, the coercive apparatus, and the courts (what Corrales labels 'autocratic legalism'); and, most originally, institutional innovation ('functional fusion') in which institutions begin to multitask. The military acquires business functions, a constituent assembly becomes a legislature, local political councils become food distribution networks, and criminal syndicates acquire some of the functions of the state. In addition, Corrales provides valuable comparative case studies: Nicaragua offers a similar story of ascendant authoritarianism, but Colombia and Ecuador suggest that liberal democracy can fight back. Somewhat surprisingly, Corrales concludes that Maduro's rule remains tenuous, well short of true autocratic consolidation.

Author Information

Javier Corrales is Dwight W. Morrow 1895 Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. The son of Cubans living in exile in Puerto Rico, Corrales has visited almost every Spanish-speaking country in the Americas, as well as Brazil. His research on Latin America has focused on the quality of democracy, regime type, presidential powers, political parties, education reforms, economic policymaking, energy security and international relations. His books include Fixing Democracy: Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America (2018) and, with Michael Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics: Venezuela and the Legacy of Hugo Chávez, 2nd ed. (Brookings, 2015).

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