Overview

Why do supposedly accountability-enhancing electoral reforms often fail in young democracies? How can legislators serve their constituents when parties control the necessary resources? Unity through Particularism sheds light on these questions and more by explaining how parties can use personal vote-seeking incentives in order to decrease intra-party dissent. Studying a unique electoral reform in Mexico, the book provides a detailed description of how institutional incentives can conflict. It draws on a variety of rich, original data sources on legislative behavior and organization in 20 Mexican states to develop a novel explanation of how electoral reforms can amplify competing institutional incentives. In settings where legislative rules and candidate selection procedures favor parties, legislators may lack the resources necessary to build voter support. If this is the case, party leaders can condition access to these resources on loyalty to the party's political agenda.

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9781009651554

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Reviews

'Lucia Motolinia thinks through what motivates legislators, what motivates parties, and how these motivations map onto political behavior more thoroughly and systematically than any previous scholarship. Then, having shifted our expectations, she tests her ideas against hard evidence from Mexican politics. This is exemplary scholarship.' John M. Carey, Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences, Dartmouth College 'In this masterful study Lucia Motolinia shows how, paradoxically, electoral reforms that give representatives an incentive to cultivate a personal vote can coexist with continued strong party unity.  With an abundance of data and a thoughtful research design this study has broad implications for our understanding of electoral politics in Mexico and beyond.' David Stasavage, Dean for the Social Sciences and Julius Silver Professor, New York University 'Investigating the real-world 'experiment' of the removal of the one-term limit in Mexico, and applying a range of advanced data analysis methods, Lucia Motolinia shows how re-election can incentivise politicians to deliver particularistic rather than policy goods. This is a foundational finding, as it challenges standard assumptions in political science. A must-read for scholars and democratic designers alike.' Simon Hix, Stein Rokkan Chair in Comparative Politics, European University Institute

Author Information

Lucia Motolinia is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Washington University in St. Louis. Her research focuses on the intricate dynamics of electoral institutions, legislative behavior, and money in politics. Her work has appeared in leading journals including The American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, and World Politics, among others.

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