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OverviewHow central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracy Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Paul TuckerPublisher: Princeton University Press Imprint: Princeton University Press Edition: 2nd edition ISBN: 9780691196305ISBN 10: 0691196303 Pages: 664 Publication Date: 10 September 2019 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Tertiary & Higher Education , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand  We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of ContentsReviewsOne of Foreign Affairs' Picks for Best of Books 2018 One of Marketwatch's Nonfiction Best of 2018 Books One of Marketwatch's Nonfiction Best of 2018 Books One of Foreign Affairs' Picks for Best of Books 2018 One of Foreign Affairs' Picks for Best of Books 2018 One of Marketwatch's Nonfiction Best of 2018 Books Tucker is right to demand a return to clear mandates for independent agencies, set and monitored by elected politicians. --Tim Hartford, Financial Times Masterful. --Dani Rodrik, Project Syndicate Reconstruct[s] from the ground up the case for the legitimate exercise of unelected power. . . . Of fundamental importance to anyone interested in the future of liberal democracy. --Felix Martin, New Statesman The most compelling recent exploration of the constitutional problems posed by an independent central bank in a democracy. . . . A thought-provoking read. --Joseph C. Sternberg, Wall Street Journal Author InformationPaul Tucker is a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and chair of the Systemic Risk Council. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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