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""This book deals with a great issue of constitutional government---how to allocate the power to make war. Only Congress can declare war, but formally declared wars are rare. The interesting questions under our Constitution concern how it allocates the power to engage in undeclared hostilities, or to authorize military or diplomatic measures that may lead to war. As Edward Keynes's subtitle suggests, these issues are in the 'Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power'...The book is well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable."" ---Judge Abraham D. Sofia, American Historical Review ""This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature."" ---Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review ""...Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing...The volume makes excellent use of brad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source.Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. "" ---Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly ""...Keynes's treatment of pertinent judicial decision, especially those spawned by the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available."" ---W. Taylor Reveley III, Columbia Law Review ""A fresh examination of the 200-year-old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War."" ---John C. Campbell, Forei

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<p> This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. <p>--Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR)

This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. --Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR)

This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR)

This well-organized and cogently written volume is accessible to upper-division students in history and political science. Treatment of the scholarly literature is extensive, and the credentials of the author are well established. A necessary acquisition on the presidency for academic libraries.</p>Selected as 'An Outstanding Academic Book for 1983.' </p>--<em>Choice</em></p>

Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of broad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. --Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly Keynes's treatment of pertinent judicial decisions, especially those spawned by the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available. --W. Taylor Reveley III, Columbia Law Review This book deals with a great issue of constitutional government--how to allocate the power to make war. Only Congress can declare war, but formally declared wars are rare. The interesting questions under our Constitution concern how it allocates the power to engage in undeclared hostilities, or to authorize military or diplomatic measures that may lead to war. As Edward Keynes's subtitle suggests, these issues are in the 'Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power'. . . . The book is well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable. --Judge Abraham D. Sofia, American Historical Review A fresh examination of the 200-year-old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War. --John C. Campbell, Foreign Affairs This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. --Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR) This well-organized and cogently written volume is accessible to upper-division students in history and political science. Treatment of the scholarly literature is extensive, and the credentials of the author are well established. A necessary acquisition on the presidency for academic libraries.Selected as 'An Outstanding Academic Book for 1983.' --Choice Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of broad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly Keynes s treatment of pertinent judicial decisions, especially those spawned by the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available. W. Taylor Reveley III, Columbia Law Review This book deals with a great issue of constitutional government how to allocate the power to make war. Only Congress can declare war, but formally declared wars are rare. The interesting questions under our Constitution concern how it allocates the power to engage in undeclared hostilities, or to authorize military or diplomatic measures that may lead to war. As Edward Keynes s subtitle suggests, these issues are in the Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power . . . . The book is well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable. Judge Abraham D. Sofia, American Historical Review A fresh examination of the 200-year-old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War. John C. Campbell, Foreign Affairs This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR) This well-organized and cogently written volume is accessible to upper-division students in history and political science. Treatment of the scholarly literature is extensive, and the credentials of the author are well established. A necessary acquisition on the presidency for academic libraries.Selected as An Outstanding Academic Book for 1983. Choice This well-organized and cogently written volume is accessible to upper-division students in history and political science. Treatment of the scholarly literature is extensive, and the credentials of the author are well established. A necessary acquisition on the presidency for academic libraries. Selected as 'An Outstanding Academic Book for 1983.' --Choice A fresh examination of the 200-year-old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War. --John C. Campbell, Foreign Affairs Keynes's treatment of pertinent judicial decisions, especially those spawned by the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available. --W. Taylor Reveley III, Columbia Law Review Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of broad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. --Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. --Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR) This book deals with a great issue of constitutional government--how to allocate the power to make war. Only Congress can declare war, but formally declared wars are rare. The interesting questions under our Constitution concern how it allocates the power to engage in undeclared hostilities, or to authorize military or diplomatic measures that may lead to war. As Edward Keynes's subtitle suggests, these issues are in the 'Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power'. . . . The book is well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable. --Judge Abraham D. Sofia, American Historical Review This well-organized and cogently written volume is accessible to upper-division students in history and political science. Treatment of the scholarly literature is extensive, and the credentials of the author are well established. A necessary acquisition on the presidency for academic libraries. Selected as An Outstanding Academic Book for 1983. Choice A fresh examination of the 200-year-old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War. John C. Campbell, Foreign Affairs Keynes s treatment of pertinent judicial decisions, especially those spawned by the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available. W. Taylor Reveley III, Columbia Law Review Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of broad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR) This book deals with a great issue of constitutional government how to allocate the power to make war. Only Congress can declare war, but formally declared wars are rare. The interesting questions under our Constitution concern how it allocates the power to engage in undeclared hostilities, or to authorize military or diplomatic measures that may lead to war. As Edward Keynes s subtitle suggests, these issues are in the Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power . . . . The book is well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable. Judge Abraham D. Sofia, American Historical Review This well-organized and cogently written volume is accessible to upper-division students in history and political science. Treatment of the scholarly literature is extensive, and the credentials of the author are well established. A necessary acquisition on the presidency for academic libraries. Selected as An Outstanding Academic Book for 1983. Choice A fresh examination of the 200-year-old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War. John C. Campbell, Foreign Affairs Keynes s treatment of pertinent judicial decisions, especially those spawned by the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available. W. Taylor Reveley III, Columbia Law Review Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of broad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly This book deals with a great issue of constitutional government how to allocate the power to make war. Only Congress can declare war, but formally declared wars are rare. The interesting questions under our Constitution concern how it allocates the power to engage in undeclared hostilities, or to authorize military or diplomatic measures that may lead to war. As Edward Keynes s subtitle suggests, these issues are in the Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power . . . . The book is well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable. Judge Abraham D. Sofia, American Historical Review This well-organized and cogently written volume is accessible to upper-division students in history and political science. Treatment of the scholarly literature is extensive, and the credentials of the author are well established. A necessary acquisition on the presidency for academic libraries. Selected as 'An Outstanding Academic Book for 1983.' --Choice A fresh examination of the 200-year-old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War. --John C. Campbell, Foreign Affairs Keynes's treatment of pertinent judicial decisions, especially those spawned by the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available. --W. Taylor Reveley III, Columbia Law Review Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of broad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. --Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly This book deals with a great issue of constitutional government--how to allocate the power to make war. Only Congress can declare war, but formally declared wars are rare. The interesting questions under our Constitution concern how it allocates the power to engage in undeclared hostilities, or to authorize military or diplomatic measures that may lead to war. As Edward Keynes's subtitle suggests, these issues are in the 'Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power'. . . . The book is well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable. --Judge Abraham D. Sofia, American Historical Review This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR) This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. --Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR)

“This book deals with a great issue of constitutional government—how to allocate the power to make war. Only Congress can declare war, but formally declared wars are rare. The interesting questions under our Constitution concern how it allocates the power to engage in undeclared hostilities, or to authorize military or diplomatic measures that may lead to war. As Edward Keynes’s subtitle suggests, these issues are in the ‘Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power’. . . . The book is well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable.” —Judge Abraham D. Sofia, American Historical Review “This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature.” —Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR) “Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of broad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns.” —Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly “Keynes’s treatment of pertinent judicial decisions, especially those spawned by the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available.” —W. Taylor Reveley III, Columbia Law Review “A fresh examination of the 200-year-old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War.” —John C. Campbell, Foreign Affairs “This well-organized and cogently written volume is accessible to upper-division students in history and political science. Treatment of the scholarly literature is extensive, and the credentials of the author are well established. A necessary acquisition on the presidency for academic libraries. Selected as ‘An Outstanding Academic Book for 1983.’” —Choice

This well-organized and cogently written volume is accessible to upper-division students in history and political science. Treatment of the scholarly literature is extensive, and the credentials of the author are well established. A necessary acquisition on the presidency for academic libraries. Selected as 'An Outstanding Academic Book for 1983.' --Choice A fresh examination of the 200-year-old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War. --John C. Campbell, Foreign Affairs Keynes's treatment of pertinent judicial decisions, especially those spawned by the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available. --W. Taylor Reveley III, Columbia Law Review Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of broad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. --Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. --Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR) This book deals with a great issue of constitutional government--how to allocate the power to make war. Only Congress can declare war, but formally declared wars are rare. The interesting questions under our Constitution concern how it allocates the power to engage in undeclared hostilities, or to authorize military or diplomatic measures that may lead to war. As Edward Keynes's subtitle suggests, these issues are in the 'Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power'. . . . The book is well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable. --Judge Abraham D. Sofia, American Historical Review

This well-organized and cogently written volume is accessible to upper-division students in history and political science. Treatment of the scholarly literature is extensive, and the credentials of the author are well established. A necessary acquisition on the presidency for academic libraries.</p>Selected as An Outstanding Academic Book for 1983. </p> <em>Choice</em></p>

Author Information

Edward Keynes is the author, co-author, or co-editor of eight other books on American politics and constitutional law, including The Court vs. Congress: Prayer, Busing, and Abortion (1989). He has been a consultant to the U.S. House of Representatives and the General Assembly of Pennsylvania. Mr. Keynes is Professor of Political Science at The Pennsylvania State University and has been visiting professor at the universities of Cologne, Kiel, and Marburg. A University of Wisconsin Ph.D., he has been a Fullbright and an Alexander von Humboldt fellow.

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