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OverviewThe concept of a value of a coalitional game, in the spirit of R.J. Aumann and L.S. Shapley, is extended to the case of games with fuzzy coalitions, providing heuristically meaningful insights into the game theoretical context, which have some impact on balance and equilibria analysis in a co-operative environment. Using the suggestive and philosophical power of the concept of fuzzy sets introduced by L.A. Zadeh, this text aims to develop the mathematical machinery of triangular norm-based measures, i.e. valuations preserving binary operations induced by triangular norms on [0, 1 ]. These results show the existence of Aumann-Shapley values for large classes of games with fuzzy coalitions satisfying certain differentiability conditions, and allow the extension of the domain of such values to games with crisp coalitions, and the application to real life situations such as rate problems for services in bulk. Full Product DetailsAuthor: D. Butnariu , Erich Peter KlementPublisher: Springer Imprint: Springer Edition: 1993 ed. Volume: 10 Dimensions: Width: 15.50cm , Height: 1.20cm , Length: 23.50cm Weight: 1.050kg ISBN: 9780792323693ISBN 10: 0792323696 Pages: 202 Publication Date: 30 September 1993 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Out of print, replaced by POD ![]() We will order this item for you from a manufatured on demand supplier. Table of ContentsI Triangular Norm—Based Tribes.- II Triangular Norm—Based Measures.- III T?—Measures.- IV Games with Fuzzy Coalitions.- V Extensions of the Diagonal Value.- VI Related Topics and Applications.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |