Overview

The ability of leaders to develop sound national security policy and strategy has suffered immensely since the Vietnam War. A primary reason for this downward trend is that civil-military relations have been generally poor since that time. This book theorizes that the quality of national security policy and strategy is directly proportional to the tenor of US civil-military relations. This theory, called the civil-military relations strategy corollary, asserts that when relations between the main actors are poor, the expected strategic outcomes are correspondingly of low quality. Conversely, when relations are of higher quality characterized by close cooperation, broad dialogue, and mutual respect--even during disagreements--the probability of positive strategic outcomes is greatly improved. Thus, it stands to reason that civilian and military senior leaders should work toward maintaining sound civil-military relations in order to achieve the best strategic outcomes for national security. This book uses historical case studies to demonstrate the theory in action and to distill the contributing factors that have caused civil-military relations to become strained over time. Finally, it provides recommendations to reverse the trend of declining civil-military relations in the United States.

Full Product Details

9781476698823

Table of Contents

Reviews

""Mike Forsyth's book is a must read for strategists. The burden of communicating what force can and most importantly cannot do lies on uniformed professionals. Forsyth's well-stated theory of civil-military relations will guide strategists and policy makers in determining how the use of force will serve in attaining policy objectives. Given the times in which we live the military must communicate more effectively and recognize that when theater and battlefield conditions change this must be thoroughly explained to policy makers. This is a moral obligation of the military profession.""-Kevin C.M. Benson, Ph.D., Colonel, US Army (ret) former director, School of Advanced Military Studies and author of Expectation of Valor: Planning for the Iraq War ""This is an insightful and important contribution to research on the dynamics involved in civil-military relations. Dr. Forsyth's comparative analysis of four historical cases of deliberation between US civilian and military leaders is detailed, well-documented, and ultimately hopeful. Forsyth devotes at least as much attention to identifying the factors that have caused these negotiations to go well as to those that have caused negotiations to result in memorable failures. He also considers what steps might be taken to strengthen those positive factors and to reverse current trends whose negative influence on future negotiations can be readily anticipated on the basis of the case studies carefully elaborated in this book.""-Daniel Burland, Ph.D., Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, editorial board, Armed Forces & Society

""Mike Forsyth's book is a must read for strategists. The burden of communicating what force can and most importantly cannot do lies on uniformed professionals. Forsyth's well-stated theory of civil-military relations will guide strategists and policy makers in determining how the use of force will serve in attaining policy objectives. Given the times in which we live the military must communicate more effectively and recognize that when theater and battlefield conditions change this must be thoroughly explained to policy makers. This is a moral obligation of the military profession.""--Kevin C.M. Benson, Ph.D., Colonel, US Army (ret) former director, School of Advanced Military Studies and author of Expectation of Valor: Planning for the Iraq War ""This is an insightful and important contribution to research on the dynamics involved in civil-military relations. Dr. Forsyth's comparative analysis of four historical cases of deliberation between US civilian and military leaders is detailed, well-documented, and ultimately hopeful. Forsyth devotes at least as much attention to identifying the factors that have caused these negotiations to go well as to those that have caused negotiations to result in memorable failures. He also considers what steps might be taken to strengthen those positive factors and to reverse current trends whose negative influence on future negotiations can be readily anticipated on the basis of the case studies carefully elaborated in this book.""--Daniel Burland, Ph.D., Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, editorial board, Armed Forces & Society

Author Information

Colonel Michael J. Forsyth (U.S. Army retired) holds a PhD in war studies from the Royal Military College of Canada and is an associate professor and director of the Department of Command and Leadership at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is the author of several books and has published many articles on history and military affairs in several publications.

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