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Author:   Uriah Kriegel (Associate Professor of Philosophy, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona)
Publisher:   Oxford University Press Inc
Imprint:   Oxford University Press Inc
Dimensions:   Width: 15.50cm , Height: 2.00cm , Length: 23.10cm
Weight:   0.417kg
ISBN:  

9780199380312

ISBN 10:   0199380317
Pages:   288
Publication Date:   29 May 2014
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Professional and scholarly ,  Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly ,  Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   To order  
Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us.

Table of Contents

Introduction 1. The Experiential Origins of Intentionality 1.1. The Concept of Intentionality and Anchoring Instances 1.1.1. An Anchoring-Instance Model of Natural Kind Concept Formation 1.1.2. Application to the Concept of Intentionality 1.2. Experiential Intentionality the Anchor 1.2.1. An Asymmetry of Ascription 1.2.2. Explaining the Asymmetry 1.2.3. Objections and Replies 1.3. 'Experiential Intentionality' 1.3.1. Definition 1.3.2. Existence 1.3.3. Scope 2. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: I. A Higher-Order Tracking Theory 2.1. A Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality? 2.1.1. Background: Tracking Theories of Mental Representation 2.1.2. Representationalist Theories of Conscious Experience 2.1.3. Experiential Tracking 2.2. The HOT Argument 2.2.1. Background: Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Experience 2.2.2. Higher-Order Theory and the Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality 2.3. Experiential Intentionality and Higher-Order Tracking 2.4. Objections and Replies 2.4.1. 'Intentionality,' 'Representation,' 'Tracking' 2.4.2. What do We Want a Theory of Intentionality for? 3. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: II. An Adverbial Theory 3.1. Background: Intentional Inexistence and Intentional Indifference 3.2. The Argument from Intentional Indifference 3.2.1. The Argument 3.2.2. Responses 3.2.3. Brains in Vats 3.3. The Argument from Intentional Inexistence 3.3.1. The Argument 3.3.2. Responses 3.4. Experiential Intentionality as Adverbial Modification 3.5. Objections to Adverbialism 4. The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality: An Interpretivist Theory 4.1. Potentialism 4.2. Inferentialism 4.3. Eliminativism 4.4. Interpretivism 4.4.1. Interpretivism about Non-Experiential Intentionality 4.4.2. Interpretivism Developed 4.4.3. Objections and Replies 5. Toward a General Theory of Intentionality 5.1. Adverbialism plus Interpretivism 5.2. Higher-Order Tracking Theory plus Interpretivism References

Reviews

.. .Kriegel has provided a rich and interesting proposal for integrating two traditionally opposed viewpoints on the nature of intentionality. --Mind

Kriegel has provided a rich and interesting proposal for integrating two traditionally opposed viewpoints on the nature of intentionality. Mind

Author Information

Uriah Kriegel is Research Director at the Jean Nicod Institute (CNRS). His work centers on consciousness and intentionality. He is also the author of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (2009) and Phenomenal Intentionality (2013), both from Oxford University Press.

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