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OverviewFull Product DetailsAuthor: Michael J. Saks , Barbara A. SpellmanPublisher: New York University Press Imprint: New York University Press Dimensions: Width: 15.20cm , Height: 2.80cm , Length: 22.90cm Weight: 0.499kg ISBN: 9780814783870ISBN 10: 0814783872 Pages: 320 Publication Date: 22 January 2016 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand ![]() We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of ContentsReviewsIn this book, two of the world's most knowledgeable experts on psychology and law show that the legal rules of evidence are based largely on conjectures about how people think about evidence. Saks and Spellman persuasively demonstrate that some of those conjectures are well-founded, some not, and some are completely at odds with the scientific literature. Who knew? -Jonathan J. Koehler,Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law Michael J. Saks and Barbara A. Spellman have succeeded brilliantly in doing what too few have attempted and many fewer still have accomplished. This book casts a bright light onto the dusty suppositions of evidence doctrine and employs contemporary psychological science to take the measure of the modern rules. Elegantly written and comprehensive in scope, Saks and Spellman's work establishes a new standard for interdisciplinary scholarship. -David L. Faigman,John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings Michael J. Saks and Barbara A. Spellman have succeeded brilliantly in doing what too few have attempted and many fewer still have accomplished. This book casts a bright light onto the dusty suppositions of evidence doctrine and employs contemporary psychological science to take the measure of the modern rules. Elegantly written and comprehensive in scope, Saks and Spellmans work establishes a new standard for interdisciplinary scholarship. -- David L. Faigman,John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings In this book, two of the worlds most knowledgeable experts on psychology and law show that the legal rules of evidence are based largely on conjectures about how people think about evidence. Saks and Spellman persuasively demonstrate that some of those conjectures are well-founded, some not, and some are completely at odds with the scientific literature. Who knew? -- Jonathan J. Koehler,Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law Anyone seeking a treasure trove of new ideas will come away motivated, as the authors admirably achieve their noble goal of bringing attention to the need for more psychological research related to the Rules. * PsycCRITIQUES * Anyone seeking a treasure trove of new ideas will come away motivated, as the authors admirably achieve their noble goal of bringing attention to the need for more psychological research related to the Rules. * PsycCRITIQUES * In this book, two of the worlds most knowledgeable experts on psychology and law show that the legal rules of evidence are based largely on conjectures about how people think about evidence. Saks and Spellman persuasively demonstrate that some of those conjectures are well-founded, some not, and some are completely at odds with the scientific literature. Who knew? -- Jonathan J. Koehler,Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law Michael J. Saks and Barbara A. Spellman have succeeded brilliantly in doing what too few have attempted and many fewer still have accomplished. This book casts a bright light onto the dusty suppositions of evidence doctrine and employs contemporary psychological science to take the measure of the modern rules. Elegantly written and comprehensive in scope, Saks and Spellmans work establishes a new standard for interdisciplinary scholarship. -- David L. Faigman,John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings Michael J. Saks and Barbara A. Spellman have succeeded brilliantly in doing what too few have attempted and many fewer still have accomplished. This book casts a bright light onto the dusty suppositions of evidence doctrine and employs contemporary psychological science to take the measure of the modern rules. Elegantly written and comprehensive in scope, Saks and Spellman s work establishes a new standard for interdisciplinary scholarship. -David L. Faigman, John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings Anyone seeking a treasure trove of new ideas will come away motivated, as the authors admirably achieve their noble goal of bringing attention to the need for more psychological research related to the Rules. * PsycCRITIQUES * Michael J. Saks and Barbara A. Spellman have succeeded brilliantly in doing what too few have attempted and many fewer still have accomplished. This book casts a bright light onto the dusty suppositions of evidence doctrine and employs contemporary psychological science to take the measure of the modern rules. Elegantly written and comprehensive in scope, Saks and Spellmans work establishes a new standard for interdisciplinary scholarship. -- David L. Faigman,John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings In this book, two of the worlds most knowledgeable experts on psychology and law show that the legal rules of evidence are based largely on conjectures about how people think about evidence. Saks and Spellman persuasively demonstrate that some of those conjectures are well-founded, some not, and some are completely at odds with the scientific literature. Who knew? -- Jonathan J. Koehler,Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law Author InformationMichael J. Saks is Regents Professor at the Arizona State University where he is on the faculties of the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and the Department of Psychology. He is the past co-editor of Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony. Barbara A. Spellman is Professor of Law (and former Professor of Psychology) at the University of Virginia. She is the former editor of Perspectives on Psychological Science. 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