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Overview1 In 1954 Karl Popper published an article attempting to show that the identification of the quantitative concept degree of confirmation with the quantitative concept degree of probability is a serious error. The error was presumably committed by J. M. Keynes, H. Reichen bach and R. Carnap. 2 It was Popper's intention then, to expose the error and to introduce an explicatum for the prescientific concept of degree of confirmation. A few months later Y. Bar-Hillel published an article attempting to show that no serious error had been committed (particularly by Carnap) and that the problem introduced by Popper was simply a ""verbal one. ""3 Popper replied immediately that ""Dr. Bar-Hillel forces me [Popper] now to criticize Carnap's theory further,"" and he [Popper] introduced further objections which, if accepted, destroy Carnap's theory. 4 About eight years after this exchange took place I was in graduate school at the University of Chicago in search of a topic for a doctoral dissertation. An investigation of the issues involved in this exchange seemed to be ideal for me because I had (and still have) a great ad miration for the work of both Carnap and Popper. A thoroughly revised and I hope improved account of that investigation appears in the first five chapters of this book. Put very briefly, what I found were four main points of contention. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Alex C. MichalosPublisher: Springer Imprint: Kluwer Academic Publishers Edition: Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1971 Dimensions: Width: 16.00cm , Height: 0.70cm , Length: 24.00cm Weight: 0.460kg ISBN: 9789024751273ISBN 10: 9024751276 Pages: 124 Publication Date: 31 July 1971 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print ![]() This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsI: Introduction.- II: Acceptability and Logical Improbability.- III: Two Explicanda and Three Arguments.- IV: Bar-Hillel's Comments and Unrestricted Universals.- V: Instance and Qualified-Instance Confirmation.- VI: The Singular Predictive Inference.- VII: Lakatos on Appraisal, Growth and Analytic Guides.- VIII: Hintikka and Hilpinen on Inductive Generalzation.- IX: Cost-Benefit Versus Expected Utility Acceptance Rules.- List of Reference.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |