Overview

Why would sovereigns ever grant political or economic liberty to their subjects? Under what conditions would rational rulers who posses ultimate authority and who seek to maximize power and wealth ever give up any of that authority? This book draws on a wide array of empirical and theoretical approaches to answer these questions, investigating both why sovereign powers might liberalize and when. The contributors to this volume argue that liberalization or democratization will only occur when those in power calculate that the expected benefits to them will exceed the costs. More specifically rulers take five main concerns into account in their cost-benefit analysis as they decide to reinforce or relax controls: personal power, internal order, external order, and control over policy - particulary economic policy. The book shows that repression is a tempting first option for rulers seeking to maximize their benefits, but that liberalization becomes more attractive as a means of minimizing losses when it becomes increasingly certain that the alternatives are chaos, deposition or even death.Chapters cover topics as diverse as the politics of 17th-century England and 20th-century Chile;

Full Product Details

Author:   Paul W. Drake ,  Mathew D. McCubbins
Publisher:   Princeton University Press
Imprint:   Princeton University Press
Dimensions:   Width: 15.20cm , Height: 1.30cm , Length: 23.50cm
Weight:   0.340kg
ISBN:  

9780691057552

ISBN 10:   0691057559
Pages:   224
Publication Date:   12 April 1998
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  College/higher education ,  Professional & Vocational ,  Tertiary & Higher Education
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   Manufactured on demand  
We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier.
Language:   English

Table of Contents

"AcknowledgmentsList of Contributors1The Origins of Liberty32Limited Government and Liberal Markets: An Introduction to ""Constitutions and Commitment""133Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England164Democracy, Capital, Skill, and Country Size: Effects of Asset Mobility and Regime Monopoly on the Odds of Democratic Rule485The International Causes of Democratization, 1974-1990706The Political Economy of Authoritarian Withdrawals927When You Wish upon the Stars: Why the Generals (and Admirals) Say Yes to Latin American ""Transitions"" to Civilian Government1158Political Structure and Economic Liberalization: Conditions and Cases from the Developing World1469Afterword179References181Index201"

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Author Information

Paul W. Drake and Mathew D. McCubbins are Professors of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. Drake is the author of Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-52; The Money Doctor in the Andes; and Labor Movements and Dictatorships. McCubbins is coauthor of The Democratic Dilemma (with Arthur Lupia); The Logic of Delegation (with D. Roderick Kiewiet); and Legislative Leviathan (with Gary W. Cox).

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