Overview
This book investigates the causes and consequences of congressional attacks on the US Supreme Court, arguing that the extent of public support for judicial independence constitutes the practical limit of judicial independence. First, the book presents a historical overview of Court-curbing proposals in Congress. Then, building on interviews with Supreme Court justices, members of Congress, and judicial and legislative staffers, the book theorizes that congressional attacks are driven by public discontent with the Court. From this theoretical model, predictions are derived about the decision to engage in Court-curbing and judicial responsiveness to Court-curbing activity in Congress. The Limits of Judicial Independence draws on illustrative archival evidence, systematic analysis of an original dataset of Court-curbing proposals introduced in Congress from 1877 onward and judicial decisions.
Full Product Details
Author: Tom S. Clark (Emory University, Atlanta)
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Imprint: Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
ISBN: 9780511761867
ISBN 10: 0511761864
Publication Date: 05 August 2012
Audience:
Professional and scholarly
,
Professional & Vocational
Format: Undefined
Publisher's Status: Active
Availability: Available To Order
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Reviews
'... the strength of [this] book lies in its recognition that judicial independence is ultimately as much about politicians as judges. Real world politics are at the heart of Clark's book, together with his recognition that many congressional practices, even those that lack any formal legal effect, hold profound significance for lawyers and judges. By drawing attention to what we might term 'the politics of judicial independence', this book is an important contribution to the regrettably still too thin literature on judicial independence.' Graham Gee, Public Law
Author Information
Tom S. Clark is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Emory University. His research interests include American judicial institutions and the interaction between courts and other political actors. His research has been published in numerous journals, including the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, and the Journal of Theoretical Politics. His dissertation, on which this book is based, was awarded the 2009 Carl Albert Award for the Best Dissertation from the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association. Clark received his Ph.D. and MA from Princeton University and BA from Rutgers University.
