Overview

The purpose of this text is twofold: to give a theory of reference for the indexical ""I"" and to explain what is involved in thinking about oneself. The first part constitutes a critique of different solutions to the problem of how ""I"" refers, while the second part advances an account of ""I"" and I-thoughts. It is argued that ""I"" refers indirectly through a ""de re"" sense that is based on non-conceptual content. ""I"" expresses an individual concept with two components: a ""de re"" sense and a context-independent self-concept. Other issues that are discussed concern self-knowledge, such as whether there is something in specific that we have to know about ourselves to be able to self-refer, and the kind of self-consciousness that is required for self-reference. Furthermore, the notions of unity of consciousness and personal identity, as they both are presupposed by a competent use of ""I"", are examined. The book is intended for philosophers of mind and language with a general interest in theories of reference and meaning, and more specifically in the first person, the self, and self-knowledge.

Full Product Details

Author:   I. Brinck
Publisher:   Springer
Imprint:   Springer
Edition:   1997 ed.
Volume:   265
Dimensions:   Width: 15.60cm , Height: 1.20cm , Length: 23.40cm
Weight:   0.970kg
ISBN:  

9780792347415

ISBN 10:   0792347412
Pages:   179
Publication Date:   31 August 1997
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Professional and scholarly ,  Undergraduate ,  Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   In Print  
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction.- 1.1 The topic.- 1.2 ‘I’.- 1.3 Why ‘I’ cannot be replaced by another indexical.- 1.4 The content.- 2. ‘I’ Does Not Refer.- 2.1 The non-referential thesis.- 2.2 Wittgenstein on ‘I’.- 2.3 Anscombe’s argument.- 2.4 Immunity to error through misidentification.- 2.5 The basis of the immunity.- 3. ‘I’ Refers Directly.- 3.1 The minimal thesis.- 3.2 Direct reference.- 3.3 The semantic theory of direct reference.- 3.4 Direct reference and rigid designation.- 3.5 Rigid designation and essentialism.- 3.6 Objections to the semantic theory of direct reference.- 3.7 Perry on belief and meaning.- 3.8 Direct reference, presemantics, and pragmatics.- 3.9 Attitudes de se.- 3.10 Acquaintance and direct reference.- 4. ‘I’ Refers Indirectly.- 4.1 Indirect reference and definite descriptions.- 4.2 Frege on ‘I’.- 4.3 Does the individual concept conflict with publicness?.- 4.4 Making sense of Frege: concepts and causes.- 4.5 Making sense of Frege: the individual concept.- 5. Indexicality andNon-Conceptual Content.- 5.1 The basis of de re senses: non-conceptual content.- 5.2 Identification-free knowledge and its foundation.- 5.3 Non-conceptual content and IEM.- 5.4 Can content be non-conceptual?.- 5.5 The cognitive role of de re senses.- 6. Context-Independence.- 6.1 Speakers and persons.- 6.2 Transcending the context.- 6.3 Identity over time.- 6.4 A view from nowhere?.- 6.5 Understanding ‘I’: conclusion.- References.

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