The Economics of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations

Author:   Ian Molho (University of Newcastle)
Publisher:   John Wiley and Sons Ltd
ISBN:  

9780631206668


Pages:   276
Publication Date:   19 September 1997
Format:   Paperback
Availability:   Out of stock   Availability explained
The supplier is temporarily out of stock of this item. It will be ordered for you on backorder and shipped when it becomes available.

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The Economics of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations


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Full Product Details

Author:   Ian Molho (University of Newcastle)
Publisher:   John Wiley and Sons Ltd
Imprint:   Wiley-Blackwell
Dimensions:   Width: 15.20cm , Height: 2.00cm , Length: 23.10cm
Weight:   0.435kg
ISBN:  

9780631206668


ISBN 10:   0631206663
Pages:   276
Publication Date:   19 September 1997
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Professional and scholarly ,  Undergraduate ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   Out of stock   Availability explained
The supplier is temporarily out of stock of this item. It will be ordered for you on backorder and shipped when it becomes available.

Table of Contents

List of Figures. List of Tables. Preface. 1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action. Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons. . 2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons. 3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model. 4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence. Part II: Signalling. 5. Job Market Signalling. 6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism. 7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory. 8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence. Part III: Moral Hazard. 9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations. 10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model. 11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory. 12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence. Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions. . 13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example. 14. Auction Design: Theory. 15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence. 16. Concluding Comments. Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory. Index.

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Author Information

Ian Molho is Reader in Applied Microeconomics in the Department of Economics, University of Newcastle. He was previously a research fellow at the University of Kent and his varied research interests include labor markets, game theory, the economics of information and evolutionary economics.

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