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OverviewIt's an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call ""knowledge"" in some (""low-standards"") contexts we'll deny is ""knowledge"" in other (""high-standards"") contexts. But do these varying standards for when ordinary speakers will attribute knowledge, and for when they are in some important sense warranted in attributing knowledge, reflect varying standards for when it is or would be true for them to attribute knowledge? Or are the standards that govern whether such claims are true always the same? And what are the implications for epistemology if these truth-conditions for knowledge claims shift with context? Contextualism is the view that the epistemic standards a subject must meet, in order for a claim attributing ""knowledge"" to her to be true, do vary with context. This has been hotly debated in epistemology and philosophy of language during the last few decades. In The Case for Contextualism Keith DeRose offers a sustained state-of-the-art exposition and defense of the contextualist position, presenting and advancing the most powerful arguments in favor of the view and against its ""invariantist"" rivals, and responding to the most pressing objections facing contextualism. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Keith DeRose (Yale University)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 16.70cm , Height: 2.00cm , Length: 23.40cm Weight: 0.474kg ISBN: 9780199692255ISBN 10: 0199692254 Pages: 304 Publication Date: 05 May 2011 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order ![]() Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of Contents"1: Contextualism, Invariantism, Skepticism, and What Goes On in Ordinary Conversation 2: The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism 3: Assertion, Knowledge, and Context 4: Single Scoreboard Semantics 5: ""Bamboozled by Our Own Words"": Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism 6: Now You Know It, Now You Don't: Intellectualism, Contextualism, and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism 7: Knowledge, Assertion and Action: Contextualism vs. Subject-Sensitive Invariantism References"ReviewsReview from previous edition This volume will be of particular benefit to graduate students and researchers looking to gain initial sympathetic familiarity with contextualism; it is also clear and accessible enough to be suitable for advanced undergraduates. This book will be among the first resources I turn to when students ask for an introduction to knows contextualism. Jonathan Ichikawa, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews "`Review from previous edition This volume will be of particular benefit to graduate students and researchers looking to gain initial sympathetic familiarity with contextualism; it is also clear and accessible enough to be suitable for advanced undergraduates. This book will be among the first resources I turn to when students ask for an introduction to ""knows"" contextualism.' Jonathan Ichikawa, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews" Review from previous edition This volume will be of particular benefit to graduate students and researchers looking to gain initial sympathetic familiarity with contextualism; it is also clear and accessible enough to be suitable for advanced undergraduates. This book will be among the first resources I turn to when students ask for an introduction to knows contextualism. * Jonathan Ichikawa, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews * Author InformationKeith DeRose is Allison Foundation Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |