Overview

This book challenges the wide use of majority rule in many constitutional courts for declaring statutes unconstitutional and argues that these courts should rather perform constitutional review by using supermajority rules. Considering that constitutional courts often tackle hard moral issues, it is questionable whether a bare majority of judges should suffice for settling them, especially considering these courts’ counter-majoritarian nature. Further, the wide use of majority rule for checking the constitutionality of legislation may increasingly risk their reputation. Such a concern is developing in the United States following a series of Supreme Court decisions. This book argues that majority rule is unjustified in constitutional review. This means that, in constitutional review, considering majority rule’s traits, there are no decisive reasons for using this voting rule over other voting rules. Additionally, the book argues that, when checking the constitutionality of legislation, constitutional courts should replace majority rule with supermajority rules. Thus, for declaring statutes unconstitutional, it is argued that more than 50% of the judges present plus one judge present should be needed. This book will be of interest to academics, researchers, and policy-makers working in the areas of Constitutional Law and Politics.

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9781032723945

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Reviews

‘A must-read for anyone interested in the institutional design of courts! Cristóbal Caviedes has produced a superb, deep and surprising piece of scholarship that invites the readers to rethink conventional wisdom by providing strong reasons for replacing majority rule with supermajority rules in constitutional review.’ Yaniv Roznai, Reichman University, Israel ‘In this insightful book, Cristóbal Caviedes fills a major gap in scholarship on institutional design and constitutional review. Identifying the importance and neglect of judicial decision procedures, he presents a rigorously argued case for supermajority voting rules on constitutional courts. A tour de force.’ Stephen Gardbaum, UCLA School of Law

Author Information

Cristóbal Caviedes is Assistant Professor of Law, Universidad Católica del Norte, Chile.

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