Overview

Seemingly unrelated controversies about consciousness, language, and vision have a deep connection, a mistake that has not been noticed. Spectator in the Cartesian Theater: Where Theories of Mind Went Wrong since Descartes suggests that this error arises not from what is put into a theory but rather from what is missing. In Daniel Dennett’s famous metaphor of a “Cartesian Theater,” a homunculus or “little man” watches the screen on which our thoughts and sensations appear. Peter Slezak argues that we fail to notice that we are doing an essential part of the work of the theory and, therefore, we are the spectators in the Cartesian theory—like looking for our spectacles while wearing them. As philosopher Jerry Fodor pointed out, “The question is not what is obvious to the theorist; the question is what follows from the theory.” This book argues that a proper understanding of the mistake reveals a deep connection among a range of seemingly unrelated problems at the forefront of controversy about consciousness, language, and vision, among others. In his physiological writings neglected by philosophers, Descartes explained how the pseudo-explanation arises, as Chomsky warns, by depending on “an intelligent and comprehending reader,” the central theme of the book.

Full Product Details

9781666923759

Table of Contents

Reviews

In this highly original book Peter Slezak puts his finger on the problem with representationalist theories of mind - they interpose the theorist, that is, ourselves, between mind and world to adjudicate the reference of mental states. He identifies versions of this spectator error in standard treatments of proper names, the Gettier problem, perceptual experience, and other central issues in contemporary philosophy. Spectator in the Cartesian Theater is breathtaking in its scope, yet firmly anchored in the primary literature and carefully argued throughout. Essential reading for anyone working in the philosophies of mind and language.--Frances Egan, Rutgers University With clear and persuasive arguments, Spectator in the Cartesian Theater provides a useful and compelling perspective on longstanding debates in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and epistemology. Slezak ties together, under one convenient rubric, a number of philosophical errors now prevalent in these fields, boldly challenging widely held assumptions, and reinterpreting the significance of classic intuition pumps from Searle, Putnam, Gettier, Newcomb, and others. This book is sure to spark controversy and push the conversation in new directions.--David Pereplyotchik, Kent State University

With clear and persuasive arguments, Spectator in the Cartesian Theater provides a useful and compelling perspective on longstanding debates in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and epistemology. Slezak ties together, under one convenient rubric, a number of philosophical errors now prevalent in these fields, boldly challenging widely held assumptions, and reinterpreting the significance of classic intuition pumps from Searle, Putnam, Gettier, Newcomb, and others. This book is sure to spark controversy and push the conversation in new directions.--David Pereplyotchik, Kent State University

In this highly original book Peter Slezak puts his finger on the problem with representationalist theories of mind - they interpose the theorist, that is, ourselves, between mind and world to adjudicate the reference of mental states. He identifies versions of this spectator error in standard treatments of proper names, the Gettier problem, perceptual experience, and other central issues in contemporary philosophy. Spectator in the Cartesian Theater is breathtaking in its scope, yet firmly anchored in the primary literature and carefully argued throughout. Essential reading for anyone working in the philosophies of mind and language. Slezak's goal is to explain what qualia are and how they are possible within a materialist framework, that is without resorting to either substance or property dualism. Slezak argues that thinking that the explanation of qualia requires some kind of dualism is the result of a seductive error that can be found in other areas of philosophy, such as a theory of meaning and epistemology, which generates problems in those areas inviting unconvincing solutions. This error is grounded on what Slezak refers to as ""the theater error,"" which comes from Danial Dennett and which supposes that the mind is a screen and there is a little person inside each person watching the show on the screen. But Slezak adds that the exact nature and upshot of the error has been misunderstood. Making such an error is itself just what should be expected if materialism is true. This is a significant study of the mind-body problem, but it also covers ground in the history of philosophy and philosophy of language. It will be useful primarily to scholars working on the mind-body problem and secondarily to those working in other areas. Recommended. Graduate students, researchers, faculty. With clear and persuasive arguments, Spectator in the Cartesian Theater provides a useful and compelling perspective on longstanding debates in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and epistemology. Slezak ties together, under one convenient rubric, a number of philosophical errors now prevalent in these fields, boldly challenging widely held assumptions, and reinterpreting the significance of classic intuition pumps from Searle, Putnam, Gettier, Newcomb, and others. This book is sure to spark controversy and push the conversation in new directions.

Author Information

Peter Slezak is honorary associate professor of philosophy at the University of New South Wales.

Tab Content 6

Customer Reviews

Recent Reviews

Countries Available