Overview

Russia threatens Eastern Europe, overtly and covertly, with offensive cyber-attacks, by shooting down aircraft, and through violations of international law such as the annexation of Crimea. The current economic sanctions are not deterring Russia from acting aggressively. Nuclear deterrence is not an appropriate or proportional deterrent of, or response to, these threats. The previous presidential administration held that Ukraine is not important enough to the United States to warrant conventional intervention. How can the United States military support a political warfare campaign to advance its national interests and deter Russia from advancing in Eastern European non-NATO states? This study examines how specific Title 10 authorities might allow an appropriate deterrent to such threats. With the absence of other options, United States Special Operations Forces are uniquely organized, trained, and equipped to operate in these environments and may provide a solution. In order to deter Russian aggression, selected Title 10 tasks require blending and assessing the following factors: strategy, tangible value at risk, tripwires, and risk of escalation. Special operations can help achieve deterrence against Russia This study begins by reviewing the literature associated with deterrence, hybrid warfare, Title 10 authorities and international relations, and then create a model based on this literature review. According to B. H. Liddell Hart, an indirect approach has the ability to out-think and out-flank the enemy geographically and psychologically.14 This study utilizes a case study of Russia's annexation of Crimea, highlighting Russia's indirect approach. This case was chosen because it is a contemporary case of hybrid warfare and good data is abundant. Additionally, Russia is geographically contiguous to Eastern Europe. This study uses a quantitative model based on the pillars of deterrence. Deterrence encompasses capability, resolve, and communication. The model weights deterrence factors for tasks with respect to the risk of escalation to reveal what tasks may or may not be appropriate under a given set of conditions. Additionally, the study provides a sensitivity analysis of the models' factors that identify whether certain changes affect outcomes. Finally, a Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) decision tool will be available for readers to manipulate if they do not agree with a given factor's weight. This study hopes to provide insight into which tasks might be most appropriate as part of a comprehensive strategy for deterring Russia in eastern European non-NATO states. This study does not outline an overall strategy towards that policy goal. Readers can adjust the factor weights and test alternative strategies using the model.

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9781720192558

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