Overview

Any theory of knowledge must be socially situated. Knowledge-including moral knowledge-is already social. Knowers, too, are already social. It is our theories of knowledge and knowing, and especially moral knowledge and knowing, that have some catching up to do. It is one aim of the following chapters to aid in this project. I seek to provide a partial answer to this question: what is epistemically required of us as socially situated moral agents? We are familiar with the idea that each of us, as moral agents, has a set of moral obligations-to be kind, to be fair, to do good, or whatever. We are also familiar with the idea that each of us, as epistemic agents, has a set of epistemic obligations-to believe truly, to follow our evidence, to engage in inquiry, or whatever. But moral agents also have epistemic obligations that arise specifically out of the challenge of figuring out what is morally required.

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9781835204221

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