Overview

Since the Global War on Terrorism began, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have been engaged in a collaborative partnership within United States Country Teams. With a shared history, including shared successes, the two organizations have experienced mission overlap, with United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF) sometimes participating in intelligence collection, and the CIA on occasion conducting more kinetic operations. Opportunities for operational overlap have helped both organizations, allowing increased mission success through increased location access, augmented numbers, shared resources, and other benefits that aid their performance. However, areas of friction also exist, including in communications platforms, Title 10 and Title 50 authorities, and lack of awareness of each other's organizational norms. This thesis details the shared history starting before World War II, examines the policies that uphold both, and conducts interviews with USSOF and CIA personnel, including those at the Naval Postgraduate School's Defense Analysis Department. This thesis finds several positive benefits from USSOF and CIA collaboration and identifies key areas of potential friction so as to document best practices for maximized interoperability that support national security interests.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.I. Introduction * A. Problem Statement * B. Research Question * C. Literature Review * 1. The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy * 2. Improvements to the Global SOF Network * 3. Operational Overlap * 4. Title 10 and Title 50 Authorities * 5. Conclusion * D. Methodology * E. Chapter Outline * II. Early History of U.S. Special Operations Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency * A. The Creation of the Office of the Coordinator of Information (1941) * B. The Beginning of the Office of Strategic Services (1942-1943) * C. OSS Successes in World War II * D. Early Post-World War II USSOF and CIA Overlap * E. Intelligence Services During the Vietnam War * F. Conclusion * III. Organizational Restructuring and the Emergence of Friction Between USSOF and the CIA * A. Background: The Need for Organizational Restructuring * B. The Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) * C. Creation of the Counterterrorism Center (1986) and Defense HUMINT Services (1992) * D. Congress, DOD, and the CIA: Gulf War and Post-Cold War * E. Further Organizational Change: 9/11 and the 9/ 11 Commission Report * F. USSOF and CIA Interoperability and Challenges Since 2001 * IV. USSOF and CIA Interview Findings * A. Interviewee Selection and IRB-Approved Questions * B. Benefits of Operational Overlap * 1. Autonomous Missions in Non-permissive Environments * 2. When CIA Can Better Gain Access to Mission-Essential Locations * C. Potential Areas Of Friction * 1. When Both Organizations Work with Host-Nation Forces for Different Purposes * 2. When Confusion Results from Title 10 and Title 50 Authorities * 3. When Organizational Norms Differ without Awareness * 4. When Individuals Lack Transparency * 5. When Military and Non-military Communications Platforms Fail to Allow Teams to Communicate * D. Three Solution-Oriented Interviewee Themes * 1. Furthering Opportunities for Effective Communication * 2. Furthering Opportunities for USSOF and CIA Interactions * 3. The Ideal Scenario: Relationship Building over Several Missions * V. Conclusion * A. Synthesis * B. Recommendations * 1. Further Identify Mission Overlap and Share Resources to Achieve Common Objectives * 2. Increase Understanding of Missions and Authorities * 3. Increase Communication and Joint Training to Enhance Transparency and Build Trust

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