Overview

On 7th December 1941, naval aircraft from six Japanese aircraft carriers destroyed the US battlefleet at Pearl Harbor, forcing the US Navy to rely on its own aircraft carriers to counter Japanese advances across the Pacific. Very fortunately, no US carriers were in port during the attack and the USN rapidly evolved a revised naval war strategy based on air strikes from aircraft carriers, the fleet's new capital ship, placed at the centre of self-sufficient task groups. Unmatched US industrial capacity enabled the design and construction of large numbers of highly capable carriers, their escorts and new naval aircraft. Despite early losses, the USN swiftly outstripped the IJN in numbers and capability, leaving the Japanese to rely on converting aircraft carriers from all manner of other vessels. Beyond the tactics and fighting skills of the US Navy in the Pacific, even beyond their remarkable adaptability, the industrial factor was essential. As Sub. Lt. Payling points out, operational mistakes at Guadalcanal and Leyte Gulf could have proved setbacks but could not have averted eventual victory such was the scale of war production of the United States. It is doubtful that this raw capacity exists anywhere in the world today, except perhaps in China. We have also lost the art of rapid production, where the US fleet - or any fleet - could expand from three carriers to fifty in the space of one year. The result is a far less forgiving naval environment where navies will find it much more difficult to 'bounce back' from a defeat or to make good on losses. This volume in the Britannia Naval Histories of WWII includes two original WWII official Royal Navy documents, previously classified, that give a contemporary account of the US Navy's Pacific War strategy. These are supported by a foreword written by a current NATO Maritime Command chief political advisor, and two modern introductory papers, with a large photographic section that vividly brings to life the ships, aircraft and battles of the Pacific naval war 1941-1945.

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9781838010744

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James Henry Bergeron Chief Political Adviser for NATO Maritime Command The Allied Maritime Command Jim Bergeron assumed duties as Political Advisor to Commander, Allied Maritime Command in Northwood, United Kingdom on 1 September 2013. Previously the POLAD to Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO from July 2005 as a member of the US Government Service, he is considered to be one of NATO's most experienced foreign policy advisors in the fields of maritime and joint expeditionary operations. He has served as POLAD in eighteen US and NATO exercises; as POLAD to the NATO Response Force exercise Steadfast Jaguar in Cape Verde and NATO Riga Summit mission in 2006; in a national capacity as POLAD to EUCOM Commander Joint Task Force Lebanon during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah Conflict; to Commander US Naval Forces Europe during the August 2008 Russia-Georgia Conflict and as POLAD to STRIKFORNATO for four Baltic Host and two BALTOPs exercises to reassure Allies of NATO solidarity. From March until July 2011 he served as the Political Advisor to NATO's CJTF Operation Unified Protector in support of UNSCR 1973 operations in Libya. He is regularly consulted on NATO maritime strategy, transformational issues and NATO-EU relations, and was one of the drafters of the Alliance Maritime Strategy. Prior to his appointment in Naples, Mr. Bergeron served as EUINATO Policy Advisor on the Staff of Commander, US Naval Forces Europe, London.

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