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OverviewWhy and under what conditions are the state's regulations complied with, and when are they violated? Resource scarcity and strict regulation of the Atlantic fisheries have generated a demand for in-depth knowledge of this issue. This comparative study is based on qualitative data from Norway and Newfoundland. It shows that informal social control is a major factor inhibiting violations of formal management regulations among fishermen, and it analyses the relevant moral norms and how they influence compliance. It addresses the relationship between collective morality and self-interest, and describes combinations of normative and strategic action. The comparison of the cases ends with a general theory on the morality of compliance in economies based on harvesting of natural resources for households as well as the market. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Stig S. GezeliusPublisher: Springer-Verlag New York Inc. Imprint: Springer-Verlag New York Inc. Edition: 2003 ed. Dimensions: Width: 15.50cm , Height: 1.50cm , Length: 23.50cm Weight: 0.540kg ISBN: 9781402015281ISBN 10: 1402015283 Pages: 235 Publication Date: 31 July 2003 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print ![]() This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of Contents1. Introduction.- 1.1 The Cases.- 1.2 The Research Question.- 1.3 Epistemological Ambitions and Research Methods.- 1.4 An Overview of the Book.- 2. Utility, Legitimacy and Punishment — Basic Analytical Framework.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 The Compliance Literature.- 2.3 Modelling Normative Aspects of Compliance.- 3. Legitimacy and Survival Among Uerhavn’s Fishermen — The Norwegian Case.- 3.1 A Fishing Community in Decline.- 3.2 Perceptions of Governmental Regulations.- 3.3 The Relevant Social Norms.- 3.4 Strategic Actors in Moral Contexts.- 3.5 Food Fishery — A Breach of the Law’s Legitimacy.- 3.6 The Role and Meanings of Formal Enforcement.- 3.7 Conclusion.- 4. Money, Subsistence and Morality in Little Spruce Harbour — The Newfoundland Case.- 4.1 A Fishing Community on the Edge of Crisis.- 4.2 Perceptions of Governmental Regulations.- 4.3 Morality, Compliance, Punishment.- 4.4 Conclusion.- 5. Accounting for Similarities — Systems of Moral Distinction.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 The Moral Meanings of Food and Money.- 5.3 Two Moral Spheres of Economic Activity.- 6. Accounting for Differences of Legitimacy — State/Society Relations in the Management of the Norwegian and Newfoundland Fisheries.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 National Identities.- 6.3 Industry Influence in Fisheries Management.- 6.4 Conclusion.- 7. Retrospect and Guidelines.- 7.1 Retrospect.- 7.2 A Few Survey Guidelines.- 7.3 Revisiting the Concept of Authority.- List of Abbreviations.- References.- List of Informants.- Government and Unions.- Fishers.- Other Personal Communication.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |