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OverviewDo the reasons we have for acting as we do derive from our concerns and desires, or are there objective values in the world that we are rationally required to pursue and protect? Alan Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible than the rival objectivist position. He provides a naturalistic account of practical rationality in terms of coherence within sets of desires or motivational states, and between motivations, intentions, and actions. Coherence is defined as the avoidance of self-defeat, the defeat of one's own deepest concerns. The demand for coherence underlies both practical and theoretical reason and derives from the natural aims of belief and action. In clarifying which desires create reasons, drawing on the literature of cognitive psychology, Goldman offers conceptual analyses of desires, emotions, and attitudes. Reasons are seen to derive ultimately from our deepest occurrent concerns. These concerns require no reasons themselves but provide reasons for many more superficial desires. In defense of this theory, Goldman argues that rational agents need not be morally motivated or concerned for their narrow self-interest. Objective values would demand such concern. They would be independent of our desires but would provide reasons for us to pursue and protect them. They would require rational agents to be motivated by them. But, Goldman argues, we are not motivated in that way, and it makes no sense to demand that our informed and coherent desires be generally other than they are. We need not appeal to such objective values in order to explain how our lives can be good and meaningful. Reasons from Within will appeal to anyone interested in the nature of values and reasons, particularly students of philosophy, psychology, and decision theory. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Alan H. Goldman (College of William and Mary, Virginia)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 15.70cm , Height: 1.60cm , Length: 23.40cm Weight: 0.418kg ISBN: 9780199658275ISBN 10: 0199658277 Pages: 284 Publication Date: 02 August 2012 Audience: General/trade , General , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand ![]() We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of Contents1: Introduction: The Debate 2: Reasons and Rationality 3: Emotions, Desires, and Reasons 4: The Externalist's Examples 5: The Case Against Objective Value 6: ConclusionReviewsReview from previous edition As a manifesto for the internalist position that clearly sets out its form, scope and challenges, Goldman's book is unsurpassed. All those with an interest in understanding normativity, in ethics or epistemology, have overwhelming reason to read it. The Philosophical Quarterly an engaging and comprehensive articulation of Subjectivism and its naturalistic advantages in our understanding of reasons ... a very welcome contribution to the literature. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews a lucid and valuable contribution to the debate over internal and external reasons a debate which, in its present form, has now entered its thirty-first year. There is a wealth of material here, and much to provoke thought: Reasons from Within is recommended reading for anyone engaged with these particular ethical and metaethical issues. Ezra Macdonald, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Author InformationAlan Goldman is William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Humanities and Professor of Philosophy at the College of William and Mary. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |