Overview

Psychological warfare is a touchy subject in western democratic societies. It raises the spectre of Nazism and totalitarian methods of mind control, yet provides an explanation for the spectacular success of the Palestinians in their fight against Israel, and their ability to exert political pressure on this regional power. This is the first book of its kind on PSYOP (psychological operations -- military actions designed to influence the perceptions and attitudes of individuals, groups and foreign governments) in Middle East research. It provides a much needed in-depth analysis of the techniques used by both the Israelis and the Palestinians. The volume clarifies the rationales for psychological warfare in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 1948 to 1991, examines the development of concepts of offensive and defensive psychological warfare as developed by the Nazis and the Soviets, as well as US and British tactics of persuasion, and the ways the main actors have adapted these tactics to the specifics of the Intifada. Close attention is paid to the formulation and dissemination of Palestinian psychological themes directed at the Arab world, neutral parties and the enemy, and official Israeli (largely unsuccessful) attempts to counter them, including official government stances and directives to the Israeli Defense Forces. The Intifada, conducted under media scrutiny, resulted in a total re-examination of Israeli military strategies, which has important bearing for the future conduct of armies fighting local insurgency, most recently the US Iraq experience. This book is essential reading for all involved in Media Studies and Military Strategy.

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9781845191344

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Reviews

"""Here is a thoughtful book concerned with the relationships among the media, the military, and policy makers. Schleifer examines the first intifada that began in 1987 and ended in 1993 when Israel granted limited authority to the Palestine National Authority. He correctly claims this to be the first book of its kind detailing how both the Israelis and the Palestinians used psychological operations. . . . Recommended."" --Choice ""As much a discussion of military tactics and strategies as it is a study of the first Initifada. At times, especially early on, it feels as though he is using the Intifada solely as a case study of psychological warfare/operations (PSYOPS). While this might be perceived as a shortcoming or narrowness of vision, it is rather a point in his favor. His approach sheds light on an area every bit as relevant to the present, though little discussed by more traditional historians and political scientists -- the role of information, and to a lesser extent, the media, in determining the outcome of violent conflicts. His dogged study of PSYOPS leads Dr. Schleifer to conclude that the Palestinians, especially the PLO, emerged from the Intifada stronger because they knew more about Israeli and western culture than vice-versa. Such specific, relevant knowledge allowed the Palestinians to form and project a message that would better affect public opinion, which in turn acted as a massive force-multiplier."" --Digest of Middle East Studies ""In this study, Ron Schleifer examines the nature of psychological operations (PSYOPS) in the Arab-Israeli conflict and looks at how they were applied during the first Intifada (1987-1993). He explores the ways in which the Palestinians were able to use the media's attention to disseminate psychological themes that invariably shaped opinions in Arab countries, Israel, and the rest of the world. Noting that the success of Palestinian PSYOPS during the uprising led the Israeli military to re-examine many of its strategies, Dr. Schleifer concludes that a comprehensive understanding of the efficacy of psychological warfare will be critical for all armies fighting future insurgencies."" --Middle East Journal ""Ron Schleifer provides valuable insights into the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians with lessons for students of strategy and counterinsurgency applicable to current operations in the Middle East."" --Defense Intelligence Journal ""Here is a thoughtful book concerned with the relationships among the media, the military, and policy makers. Schleifer examines the first intifada that began in 1987 and ended in 1993 when Israel granted limited authority to the Palestine National Authority. He correctly claims this to be the first book of its kind detailing how both the Israelis and the Palestinians used psychological operations. . . . Recommended."" --""Choice"""

As much a discussion of military tactics and strategies as it is a study of the first Initifada. At times, especially early on, it feels as though he is using the Intifada solely as a case study of psychological warfare/operations (PSYOPS). While this might be perceived as a shortcoming or narrowness of vision, it is rather a point in his favor. His approach sheds light on an area every bit as relevant to the present, though little discussed by more traditional historians and political scientists -- the role of information, and to a lesser extent, the media, in determining the outcome of violent conflicts. His dogged study of PSYOPS leads Dr. Schleifer to conclude that the Palestinians, especially the PLO, emerged from the Intifada stronger because they knew more about Israeli and western culture than vice-versa. Such specific, relevant knowledge allowed the Palestinians to form and project a message that would better affect public opinion, which in turn acted as a massive force-multiplier. --Digest of Middle East Studies In this study, Ron Schleifer examines the nature of psychological operations (PSYOPS) in the Arab-Israeli conflict and looks at how they were applied during the first Intifada (1987-1993). He explores the ways in which the Palestinians were able to use the media's attention to disseminate psychological themes that invariably shaped opinions in Arab countries, Israel, and the rest of the world. Noting that the success of Palestinian PSYOPS during the uprising led the Israeli military to re-examine many of its strategies, Dr. Schleifer concludes that a comprehensive understanding of the efficacy of psychological warfare will be critical for all armies fighting future insurgencies. --Middle East Journal Ron Schleifer provides valuable insights into the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians with lessons for students of strategy and counterinsurgency applicable to current operations in the Middle East. --Defense Intelligence Journal Here is a thoughtful book concerned with the relationships among the media, the military, and policy makers. Schleifer examines the first intifada that began in 1987 and ended in 1993 when Israel granted limited authority to the Palestine National Authority. He correctly claims this to be the first book of its kind detailing how both the Israelis and the Palestinians used psychological operations. . . . Recommended. --Choice Here is a thoughtful book concerned with the relationships among the media, the military, and policy makers. Schleifer examines the first intifada that began in 1987 and ended in 1993 when Israel granted limited authority to the Palestine National Authority. He correctly claims this to be the first book of its kind detailing how both the Israelis and the Palestinians used psychological operations. . . . Recommended. -- Choice

As much a discussion of military tactics and strategies as it is a study of the first Initifada. At times, especially early on, it feels as though he is using the Intifada solely as a case study of psychological warfare/operations (PSYOPS). While this might be perceived as a shortcoming or narrowness of vision, it is rather a point in his favor. His approach sheds light on an area every bit as relevant to the present, though little discussed by more traditional historians and political scientists -- the role of information, and to a lesser extent, the media, in determining the outcome of violent conflicts. His dogged study of PSYOPS leads Dr. Schleifer to conclude that the Palestinians, especially the PLO, emerged from the Intifada stronger because they knew more about Israeli and western culture than vice-versa. Such specific, relevant knowledge allowed the Palestinians to form and project a message that would better affect public opinion, which in turn acted as a massive force-multiplier. -- Digest of Middle East Studies

Author Information

Ron Schleifer is a senior lecturer at the Ariel University Center in Israel and the head of the Ariel Research Center for Defence and Communications. For the past 25 years he has been researching the psychological warfare perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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