Full Product Details
Author: Charles Travis (King's College London)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Imprint: Oxford University Press
Dimensions:
Width: 16.20cm
, Height: 3.10cm
, Length: 23.70cm
Weight: 0.804kg
ISBN: 9780199676545
ISBN 10: 0199676542
Pages: 428
Publication Date: 13 June 2013
Audience:
College/higher education
,
Professional and scholarly
,
Tertiary & Higher Education
,
Professional & Vocational
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active
Availability: To order
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Reviews
a stimulating and original contribution to many debates in contemporary philosophy of perception. Travis's rehabilitation of Fregean anti-psychologism is a welcome and timely development ... this collection presents a coherent and impressive case against the prevailing representationalist consensus, and is perhaps best read as setting the agenda for an alternative, non-representational understanding of perceptual psychology and the metaphysics of mind and consciousness. As such, philosophers of mind, language and perception will find much of interest here, both in terms of building upon Travis's previous work, and in opening up new lines of enquiry in the debates about perceptual content, representation and disjunctivism. Keith A. Wilson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
a stimulating and original contribution to many debates in contemporary philosophy of perception. Travis's rehabilitation of Fregean anti-psychologism is a welcome and timely development . . . this collection presents a coherent and impressive case against the prevailing representationalist consensus, and is perhaps best read as setting the agenda for an alternative, non-representational understanding of perceptual psychology and the metaphysics of mind and consciousness. As such, philosophers of mind, language and perception will find much of interest here, both in terms of building upon Travis's previous work, and in opening up new lines of enquiry in the debates about perceptual content, representation and disjunctivism. * Keith A. Wilson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews * the reader who ventures to follow Travis along the lines of argument contained in these essays will be rewarded with rich reflections on some of the most central topics in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. * James Genone, Mind *
Author Information
Charles Travis is Professor of Philosophy at King's College London, and a researcher in the University of Porto's Institute of Philosophy, and, more specifically, the Mind, Language and Action Group. He received his doctorate from UCLA, and has taught at a number of universities in the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Scotland, and England. Besides perception he has written on philosophy of language, Wittgenstein, objectivity and the idea of forms of thought, and issues in philosophy of psychology, notably concerning propositional attitudes.
