Overview

The rich, multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary field of matching-based market design is an active and important one due to its highly successful applications with economic and sociological impact. Its home is economics, but with intimate connections to algorithm design and operations research. With chapters contributed by over fifty top researchers from all three disciplines, this volume is unique in its breadth and depth, while still being a cohesive and unified picture of the field, suitable for the uninitiated as well as the expert. It explains the dominant ideas from computer science and economics underlying the most important results on market design and introduces the main algorithmic questions and combinatorial structures. Methodologies and applications from both the pre-Internet and post-Internet eras are covered in detail. Key chapters discuss the basic notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives, and the way market design seeks solutions guided by normative criteria borrowed from social choice theory.

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9781108831994

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Reviews

'This superb compendium of all aspects of matching markets is an excellent text for advanced students and a definitive reference that integrates economic and computational aspects of market design.' Robert Wilson, The Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, Stanford University 'Matching markets are among the earliest points of contact between the theories of economics and computation. Decades before the advent of Algorithmic Game Theory, great economists articulated discrete algorithmic problems involving agents, goods, and preferences, and invented efficient algorithms for their solution. In the era of the Internet, the importance of the subject has exploded, and so has the convergence of computational and economic research on it. This comprehensive collection of expertly written articles exhausting the many facets of this important topic is destined to influence its further evolution, and will be a quintessential source for students and researchers.' Christos H. Papadimitriou, Donovan Family Professor of Computer Science, Columbia University 'A multi-authored textbook is a challenging project, all the more so on a deeply interdisciplinary topic. Starting from the mathematical foundations and developing into sophisticated applications and empirics, all along supplemented by a rich menu of exercises, this volume makes the state of the art of market design equally accessible to the beginner students and advanced researchers.' Hervé Moulin, The Donald J Robertson Professor of Economics, University of Glasgow 'The modern digital economy depends crucially on the performance of matching-based markets for goods and services ranging from energy to healthcare to cloud services and beyond. So it is wonderful to have a book that develops the beautiful and rich algorithmic and game theoretic foundations of these markets, taking us all the way to the research frontier. I can't wait to teach a course on online and matching-based market design based on this book!' Anna Karlin, Professor and Bill and Melinda Gates Chair of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Washington 'The definitive handbook for a beautiful scientific area that combines elegant theory with a variety of practical applications, economics with computer science, and classical results with fierce ongoing research.' Noam Nisan, Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

'This superb compendium of all aspects of matching markets is an excellent text for advanced students and a definitive reference that integrates economic and computational aspects of market design.' Robert Wilson, The Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, Stanford University 'Matching markets are among the earliest points of contact between the theories of economics and computation. Decades before the advent of Algorithmic Game Theory, great economists articulated discrete algorithmic problems involving agents, goods, and preferences, and invented efficient algorithms for their solution. In the era of the Internet, the importance of the subject has exploded, and so has the convergence of computational and economic research on it. This comprehensive collection of expertly written articles exhausting the many facets of this important topic is destined to influence its further evolution, and will be a quintessential source for students and researchers.' Christos H. Papadimitriou, Donovan Family Professor of Computer Science, Columbia University 'A multi-authored textbook is a challenging project, all the more so on a deeply interdisciplinary topic. Starting from the mathematical foundations and developing into sophisticated applications and empirics, all along supplemented by a rich menu of exercises, this volume makes the state of the art of market design equally accessible to the beginner students and advanced researchers.' Herve Moulin, The Donald J Robertson Professor of Economics, University of Glasgow 'The modern digital economy depends crucially on the performance of matching-based markets for goods and services ranging from energy to healthcare to cloud services and beyond. So it is wonderful to have a book that develops the beautiful and rich algorithmic and game theoretic foundations of these markets, taking us all the way to the research frontier. I can't wait to teach a course on online and matching-based market design based on this book!' Anna Karlin, Professor and Bill and Melinda Gates Chair of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Washington 'The definitive handbook for a beautiful scientific area that combines elegant theory with a variety of practical applications, economics with computer science, and classical results with fierce ongoing research.' Noam Nisan, Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Author Information

Federico Echenique is a Professor of Economics at the University of California at Berkeley. He has published articles in the American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, and Theoretical Economics. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society, and co-editor of Theoretical Economics. Echenique was Program Co-chair of EC 2021. Nicole Immorlica is a Principal Researcher at the Microsoft Research New England Laboratory. She has published more than 80 scholarly articles, surveys, and book chapters on topics including algorithmic game theory, market design, social networks, theoretical computer science, and economics. Her honors include the Harvard Excellence in Teaching Award, a Sloan Fellowship, and an NSF Career Award. Immorlica is Chair of SIGecom, former Vice Chair of SIGACT, Associate Editor of ACM Transactions on Economics and Computing, and was Program Co-chair for EC 2019. Vijay V. Vazirani is Distinguished Professor in the Computer Science Department at the University of California, Irvine. He is one of the founders of algorithmic game theory, focusing on the computability of market equilibria. He is an ACM Fellow, a Guggenheim Fellow, and the recipient of the 2022 INFORMS John von Neumann Theory Prize. His previous books include Approximation Algorithms and (co-edited) Algorithmic Game Theory.

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