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"Occasionally, there are concepts in the law that are so ubiquitous that the lacuna in our understanding of their fundamental nature goes, for the most part, unnoticed. I take the concept of human rights in international, regional, and domestic legal practices to be one such case. It has never been entirely clear what human rights are to the law. Should they be seen, on the one hand, as concrete legal grounds for claims of individuals against state practices or, in the alternative, as merely persuasive moral or political considerations offered in favor of the demands of just, fair, and equal treatment? Of course, over the past few decades we have seen the development of cases where human rights are argued as ""legal rights"" in a practice of human rights that is recognizably a ""legal practice."" For instance, there have been thousands of cases litigated in international, regional, and domestic Human Rights Courts. But what is less clear is what makes some human rights legal rights while other assertions of human rights-sometimes even in legal contexts-are not taken to be assertions of legal right. One might think that the obvious answer lies in establishing first what it is to have a legal right in a legal practice and then asking whether human rights qualify under these criteria. However, as any legal philosopher will tell you, there is nothing obvious about such an answer. Setting the criteria for the recognition of legal rights and legal practices can prove difficult even in the most established and presently existing systems. It is all the more difficult when searching for that criteria in a system based on fundamental human rights in an emerging and unprecedented international legal practice."

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9781835202289

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