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OverviewPhysicalism has over the past 20 years become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the US and Australia show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in acccomodating sensory consciousness, but also bring out its inadequacies in dealing with thought, intentionality, abstract objects (such as numbers), and principles of both theoretical and practical reason; even its ability to cope with the physical works itself is called into question. Both strong ""reductionist"" versions and weaker ""supervenience"" theories are discussed and found to face different but equally formidable obstacles. The impression with which these essays seek to leave the reader is that the advance of physicalism has been achieved more by talking down the problems that face it than by solving them. This book should be of interest to professional philosophers and students (second-year undergraduate and above) interested in the philosophy of mind. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Howard RobinsonPublisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Clarendon Press Dimensions: Width: 13.00cm , Height: 2.50cm , Length: 21.00cm Weight: 0.576kg ISBN: 9780198242567ISBN 10: 0198242565 Pages: 332 Publication Date: 01 March 1993 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order ![]() Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of Contents"Introduction, Howard Robinson; thinking, George Myro; physicalism and mathematics, Bob Hale; transcendental arguments against physicalism, Ralph Walker; action, causes and mental ascriptions, Grant Gillett; materialism and the logical structure of intentionality, George Bealer; truth, physicalism, and ultimate theory, Steven Wagner; the anti-materialist strategy and the ""knowledge argument"", Howard Robinson; incorrigibility, Richard Warner; weak materialism, Nicholas Nathan; non-reductive physicalism, David Smith; difficulties with physicalism, and a programme for dualists, Peter Forrest; the grain problem, Michael Lockwood; the succinct case for idealism, John Foster."ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |