Overview

Jihwan Hwang analyzes Pyongyang’s nuclear policy changes over the last three decades under Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un. Why did a weaker North Korea take the risk of standing up against the much stronger U.S. with its nuclear weapons program, even escalating the crisis to the point of a war? Later, why did North Korea change its course of action amid the crisis even though the security environment remained essentially the same? Hwang draws on the main tenets of prospect theory in international relations and argues that Pyongyang becomes either risk-acceptant or risk-averse toward the U.S., depending on the situation it faces. When Pyongyang perceived the status quo to be deteriorating, it framed its situation as a loss and chose a risk-acceptant of confrontation to restore the status quo. Equally, when Pyongyang perceived the situation to be improving, it chose a risk-averse engagement in the domain of gain. In contrast, when Pyongyang perceived an extreme loss such as military confrontation against the United States, it would rather choose a risk-averse policy to avoid the catastrophic outcome of war. The issues of risk are central to an understanding of Pyongyang’s nuclear policy decision-making.

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9781793650269

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"""North Korea's nuclear program is arguably one of the most contentious issues facing the world. Jihwan Hwang applies prospect theory with great skill and verve to illuminate the many changes in Pyongyang's stance on this issue over the past three decades. He offers an insightful explanation of this phenomenon as North Korea's leaders respond to their changing domestic and international circumstances. His comprehensive account should be of interest to all those who are interested in the topics of nuclear proliferation and Northeast Asia's stability."" -- Steve Chan, College Professor of Distinction, Emeritus, University of Colorado, Boulder “In this book, Hwang masterfully analyses the evolution of North Korea's nuclear policy throughout its history and all day to the present. Highly recommended.” -- Ramon Pacheco Pardo, King's College London In North Korea, Nuclear Risk-Taking, and the United States, Professor Jihwan Hwang examines the enigma of North Korean nuclear diplomacy from the 1990s to the present under three different rulers of the Kim family regime. Drawing on insights from prospect theory to explain North Korea’s risk-taking behavior, Professor Hwang offers a unique analysis to a vexing security problem that will be of great value and interest to scholars and policy practitioners alike. -- Andrew Yeo, Professor of Politics, The Catholic University of American & Senior Fellow and SK Korea Foundation Chair, Brookings Institution The reasons for the constant shifts in North Korea's nuclear policy have been the subject of much unfruitful debate that has yielded few real answers. Jihwan Hwang's systematic study of North Korea's nuclear policy since the end of the Cold War offers some critical insights into this problem. He carefully explains how an array of internal and external factors have prompted shifts in North Korea's policy over the years. It is a clearly-written and incisive manuscript that needs to be read by anyone with a serious interest in understanding North Korea's seemingly unexplainable behavior. -- Gregg Brazinsky, The George Washington University"

Author Information

Jihwan Hwang is professor of International Relations at the University of Seoul, Korea.

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