Overview

Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a nonCartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal. After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality.

Full Product Details

Author:   Lynne Rudder Baker (Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA)
Publisher:   Oxford University Press Inc
Imprint:   Oxford University Press Inc
Dimensions:   Width: 13.70cm , Height: 2.00cm , Length: 20.60cm
Weight:   0.295kg
ISBN:  

9780199914746

ISBN 10:   0199914745
Pages:   272
Publication Date:   04 April 2013
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Undergraduate ,  Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   Available To Order  
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Table of Contents

Introduction: What is the Problem? ; The Claim of Naturalism ; A Challenge to Naturalism ; What is at Stake ; An Overview ; Part I: The Core Argument ; Ch. 1. Varieties of Naturalism ; What Counts As 'Science'? ; Reductive Naturalism ; Nonreductive Naturalism ; Disenchantment and Optimism ; Ch. 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective ; What is Naturalization? ; The Robust First-Person Perspective ; The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective ; Ch. 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective ; John Perry on an Epistemic Account of the Self ; David Lewis on De Se Belief ; A Comment on John Searle ; Can Cognitive Science Save the Day? ; Ch. 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective ; Daniel Dennett on Consciousness ; Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory ; My Recommendation ; Ch. 5. Arguments Against First-Person Naturalization ; From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties ; A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties ; A Metaphysical Argument Against Ontological Naturalism ; Part II: An Account of the First-Person Perspective ; Ch. 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective ; The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness ; Language and the Acquisition of Concepts ; How to Acquire a Self-Concept ; Human Persons: Wrap Up ; Ch. 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent? ; Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach ; Objections and Replies ; Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory ; Johnston's Critique Side-Stepped ; Ch. 8. A Metaphysical Framework for The First-Person Perspective ; First-Person Properties ; Dispositional Properties ; Haecceitistic Implications ; Ch. 9. Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-person Perspective ; Personhood ; Agency ; Artifacts ; Moral Responsibility ; Ch. 10. Natural Reality ; Near-Naturalism ; Property-Constitution and Causation ; Emergentism and Downward Causation ; How Naturalistic is Near-Naturalism? ; Index

Reviews

As shown by Lynne Baker in her profound new book, scientific naturalism comes in different versions, depending on how its advocates respond to some crucial open issues...Baker sets a series of ambitious goals for her book. --Philosophical Review

As shown by Lynne Baker in her profound new book, scientific naturalism comes in different versions, depending on how its advocates respond to some crucial open issues...Baker sets a series of ambitious goals for her book. Philosophical Review

Author Information

Lynne Rudder Baker is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Baker has written four books on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and has published many articles in philosophy journals such as The Journal of Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and many more.

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