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OverviewThis book defends moral cognitivism with a new approach. The author maintains that the truth of moral judgments is determined in fundamentally the same way as is the truth of non-moral judgments, i.e. by appeal to truth conditions which are incorporated in beliefs held in common by a wide variety of societies. She argues that if a moral theory can be developed which can account for widely held, well-established moral beliefs, this would provide a set of truth conditions for moral judgments. A theory designed to do this - and through which major moral disagreements can be resolved - is presented here, together with discussions of many actual and possible objections. The book is intended for professional philosophers and advanced students of philosophy. Full Product DetailsAuthor: M.G. ForresterPublisher: Springer Imprint: Springer Edition: Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2002 Volume: 10 Dimensions: Width: 16.00cm , Height: 1.60cm , Length: 24.00cm Weight: 0.474kg ISBN: 9789048160518ISBN 10: 9048160510 Pages: 293 Publication Date: 09 December 2010 Audience: College/higher education , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Out of stock ![]() The supplier is temporarily out of stock of this item. It will be ordered for you on backorder and shipped when it becomes available. Table of Contents1: Metaethical Background.- 2: The Meaning of ‘Ought’ — a Formal Scheme.- 3: Individual Good as Happiness.- 4: Objections to Good as Happiness.- 5: Beneficence and Fairness.- 6: Beneficence and Fairness Combined — the Primary Objective of Morality.- 7: Agent-relative Restrictions.- 8: Oughts, Obligations and the Best.- 9: Solving Moral Problems.- Notes.- References.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |