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OverviewThis Element defends mathematical anti-realism against an underappreciated problem with that view-a problem having to do with modal truthmaking. Part I develops mathematical anti-realism, it defends that view against a number of well-known objections, and it raises a less widely discussed objection to anti-realism-an objection based on the fact that (a) mathematical anti-realists need to commit to the truth of certain kinds of modal claims, and (b) it's not clear that the truth of these modal claims is compatible with mathematical anti-realism. Part II considers various strategies that anti-realists might pursue in trying to solve this modal-truth problem with their view, it argues that there's only one viable view that anti-realists can endorse in order to solve the modal-truth problem, and it argues that the view in question-which is here called modal nothingism-is true. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Mark Balaguer (California State University)Publisher: Cambridge University Press Imprint: Cambridge University Press Dimensions: Width: 15.10cm , Height: 0.60cm , Length: 22.80cm Weight: 0.150kg ISBN: 9781009346016ISBN 10: 1009346016 Pages: 75 Publication Date: 05 January 2023 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand ![]() We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of Contents1. Introduction; 2. What is mathematical anti-realism?; 3. Mathematical error theory defended; 4. Paraphrase nominalism and deflationary-truth nominalism revisited; 5. Modal semantics and modal truthmaking; 6. Possible worlds; 7. Modal primitivism; 8. Modal nothingism to the rescue; References.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |