Overview

The book investigates a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. The experimental design allows investigation of how subjects solve the bargaining problem. A prominence level analysis is applied to the data and suggests that subjects tend to choose ""round"" numbers. It is shown that there exists a correlation between machiavellianism and subjects' adjustment behaviour in the game. The learning behaviour is discussed extensively. Plaintiffs' acceptance limits polarize at the beginning of the second play. A model of learning direction theory applied to explain subjects's behaviour over the course of the game.

Full Product Details

Author:   Wolfgang Ryll
Publisher:   Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
Imprint:   Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Edition:   Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1996
Volume:   440
Dimensions:   Width: 15.50cm , Height: 1.00cm , Length: 23.30cm
Weight:   0.610kg
ISBN:  

9783540613046

ISBN 10:   3540613048
Pages:   176
Publication Date:   12 July 1996
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Professional and scholarly ,  Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   In Print  
This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us.

Table of Contents

Reviews

Author Information

Tab Content 6

Author Website:  

Customer Reviews

Recent Reviews

No review item found!

Add your own review!

Countries Available

All regions