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OverviewThis book provides both a unique, first-hand account of German and European diplomacy in the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis and a detailed analysis of the major issues. By correcting the many misperceptions and misjudgments about that period, the book will put the debate on Western involvement in the former Yugoslavia on a new and more solid basis. This book presents both a detailed historical account of German diplomacy in the first year of the Yugoslav crisis and a thorough analysis of the issues that Germany and the international community faced at the time. Written by the German diplomat responsible for the conduct of German policy on the working level, the book is a compelling, first-hand view of the motives, perceptions, and actions of the German government. Part I is a chronological treatment of the responses of the European Community and of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to developments on the ground—in particular, the military conflict in Croatia and the German role in shaping these responses. Part II provides a systematic treatment of the causes of the conflict and the major issues raised by the Yugoslav crisis, such as questions concerning self-determination, frontiers, the role of history, and the recognition of successor states. Taken together, the two parts provide a comprehensive analysis of the origins of international involvement in the Bosnian war. This book will interest scholars, researchers, and policymakers involved with the Bosnian conflict and contemporary German and international relations. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Donald D. Halstead , Michael LibalPublisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc Imprint: Praeger Publishers Inc Dimensions: Width: 15.60cm , Height: 1.50cm , Length: 23.50cm Weight: 0.510kg ISBN: 9780275957988ISBN 10: 0275957985 Pages: 224 Publication Date: 20 November 1997 Recommended Age: From 7 to 17 years Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of ContentsPreface Germany and Yugoslavia: The Story, 1991-1992 Germany and Yugoslavia Before the Summer of 1991 The Crisis Breaks: 23 June-7 July 1991 Serbia Launches a New Balkan War: July-August 1991 Birth of the Peace Conference: August-September 1991 The Death of Yugoslavia: September-October 1991 Struggling with Serb Obstinacy: October-November 1991 The Road to Recognition: November-December 1991 The War Spreads to Bosnia: January-June 1992 The London Conference: July-August 1992 Germany and Yugoslavia: 1991-1992: The Issues On Values and Interests Between Self-Determination and Institutional Legitimacy: On the Dangers and Limits of Political Rhetoric Shadows of the Past: Did Germany Re-enact History? A New Balkan War: On the Nature and Origins of the Conflicts in Yugoslavia States and Frontiers: On the Dialectic of Unity and Diversity in the Yugoslav Realm Resisting False Claims: Why Serbia Is Not Yugoslavia (and Never Was) Recognition: The Myth of Prematureness Recognition: The Legend of Unilateralism Conclusions Correct Insights and Sound Principles Cannot Cure Behavioral Weaknesses Notes Chronology of Events Glossary Annotated Bibliography IndexReviewsThe first part of this book, based on the author's personal experience, is a valuable contribution to study of the issues. -International Journal It is a welcome addition to literature....The first half of the book provides a meticulous, almost day-by-day account of the unfolding crisis....Libal's account of German policy is exhaustive, reliable, and balanced....In the end...Libal's excellent analysis helps to exonerate German policy towards Yugoslavia only up to a point.... -H-Net Reviews �H�e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse. -????? ?The first part of this book, based on the author's personal experience, is a valuable contribution to study of the issues.?-International Journal ?It is a welcome addition to literature....The first half of the book provides a meticulous, almost day-by-day account of the unfolding crisis....Libal's account of German policy is exhaustive, reliable, and balanced....In the end...Libal's excellent analysis helps to exonerate German policy towards Yugoslavia only up to a point....?-H-Net Reviews ?[H]e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse.?-????? [H]e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse. - [H]e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse. - ?[H]e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse.?-????? ?It is a welcome addition to literature....The first half of the book provides a meticulous, almost day-by-day account of the unfolding crisis....Libal's account of German policy is exhaustive, reliable, and balanced....In the end...Libal's excellent analysis helps to exonerate German policy towards Yugoslavia only up to a point....?-H-Net Reviews ?The first part of this book, based on the author's personal experience, is a valuable contribution to study of the issues.?-International Journal YHe correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse. -????? It is a welcome addition to literature....The first half of the book provides a meticulous, almost day-by-day account of the unfolding crisis....Libal's account of German policy is exhaustive, reliable, and balanced....In the end...Libal's excellent analysis helps to exonerate German policy towards Yugoslavia only up to a point.... -H-Net Reviews The first part of this book, based on the author's personal experience, is a valuable contribution to study of the issues. -International Journal [H]e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse. - ""[H]e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse.""- ?[H]e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse.?-????? ?It is a welcome addition to literature....The first half of the book provides a meticulous, almost day-by-day account of the unfolding crisis....Libal's account of German policy is exhaustive, reliable, and balanced....In the end...Libal's excellent analysis helps to exonerate German policy towards Yugoslavia only up to a point....?-H-Net Reviews ?The first part of this book, based on the author's personal experience, is a valuable contribution to study of the issues.?-International Journal ""�H�e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse.""-????? ""It is a welcome addition to literature....The first half of the book provides a meticulous, almost day-by-day account of the unfolding crisis....Libal's account of German policy is exhaustive, reliable, and balanced....In the end...Libal's excellent analysis helps to exonerate German policy towards Yugoslavia only up to a point....""-H-Net Reviews ""The first part of this book, based on the author's personal experience, is a valuable contribution to study of the issues.""-International Journal Author InformationMICHAEL LIBAL is Ambassador, Head of the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to Georgia. An historian and political scientist by training, he has studied and taught at American universities. As a diplomat, he has specialized in Russian and Eastern European Affairs. From 1991 to 1995, he headed the German Foreign Ministry's department dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, and in 1995-1996 he was a Fellow of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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