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OverviewFull Product DetailsAuthor: StanleyPublisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 13.80cm , Height: 1.60cm , Length: 21.60cm Weight: 0.756kg ISBN: 9780199288038ISBN 10: 0199288038 Pages: 208 Publication Date: 01 November 2005 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order ![]() Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of ContentsIntroduction; 1. Contextualism; 2. Knowledge Ascriptions and Gradability; 3. Knowledge Ascriptions and Context-Sensitivity; 4. Contextualism on the Cheap?; 5. Interest-Relative Invariantism; 6. Interest-Relative Invariantism vs. Contextualism; 7. Interest-Relative Invariantism vs. Relativism; 8. Contextualism, Interest-Relativism, and Philosophical Paradox; 9. ConclusionReviewsThis book is deep and genuinely interesting...this is a book that deserves respect and applause. Alessandro Capone Needless to say, I find Stanley's book extremely important and powerfully argued. I recommend it highly, not only to those interested in recent debates over the semantics of knowledge attributions, for whom it is absolutely essential, but also to anyone with a healthy interest in what knowledge is - and indeed to anybody who enjoys well-executed, insightful philosophy books Keith DeRose, Mind Jason Stanleys Knowledge and Practical Interests is a brilliant book, combining insights about knowledge with a careful examination of how recent views in epistemology fit with the best of recent linguistic semantics. Gilbert Harman, Princeton University Stanley's book ... is a model of clarity and showcases one of philosophy's brightest young things at his best ... a great, wide-ranging, must-read book ... This is a book that is rich with insight and argument and which has a broad philosophical reach. These features of the book by themselves ensure that it is essential reading. Duncan Pritchard, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Author InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |