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OverviewThe self for Kant is something real, and yet is neither appearance nor thing in itself, but rather has some third status. Appearances for Kant arise in space and time where these are respectively forms of outer and inner attending (intuition). Melnick explains the ""third status"" by identifying the self with intellectual action that does not arise in the progression of attending (and so is not appearance), but accompanies and unifies inner attending. As so accompanying, it progresses with that attending and is therefore temporal--not a thing in itself. According to Melnick, the distinction between the self or the subject and its thoughts is a distinction wholly within intellectual action; only such a non-entitative view of the self is consistent with Kant’s transcendental idealism. As Melnick demonstrates in this volume, this conception of the self clarifies all of Kant’s main discussions of this issue in the Transcendental Deduction and the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Arthur MelnickPublisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd Imprint: Routledge Dimensions: Width: 15.20cm , Height: 1.30cm , Length: 22.90cm Weight: 0.360kg ISBN: 9780415887793ISBN 10: 0415887798 Pages: 186 Publication Date: 03 November 2010 Audience: College/higher education , Tertiary & Higher Education , Undergraduate Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print ![]() This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsPreface PART I: Preliminary Overview Chapter One: The Reality of the Thinking Subject Chapter Two: The Paralogisms and Transcendental Idealism PART II: The Thinking Subject Chapter Three: The First Paralogism Chapter Four: The Second Paralogism Chapter Five: Transcendental Self-Consciousness Chapter Six: Other Interpretations of the Paralogisms PART III: The Cognizing Subject Chapter Seven: Empirical Apperception Chapter Eight: Pure Apperception PART IV: The Person as Subject Chapter Nine: Apperception and Inner Sense Chapter Ten: The Third Paralogism and Kant’s Conception of a Person PART V: The Subject and Material Reality Chapter Eleven: The Embodied Subject Chapter Twleve: The Fourth Paralogism Notes Bibliography IndexReviewsMelnick's book is rich as an interpretation of Kant, as a study of phenomenology, and as a fairly revisionary picture of metaphysics...Activity-based interpretations of Kant's view on the self have been suggested elsewhere by others, but none has been fleshed out in the way Melnick's is here. As Melnick shows, there are important reasons why such a reading of Kant is appealing, and any commentator wrestling with Kant's views on the self would do well to consider carefully Melnick's contribution to the literature. - Colin Marshall, New York University, USA Melnick's book is rich as an interpretation of Kant, as a study of phenomenology, and as a fairly revisionary picture of metaphysics...Activity-based interpretations of Kant's view on the self have been suggested elsewhere by others, but none has been fleshed out in the way Melnick's is here. As Melnick shows, there are important reasons why such a reading of Kant is appealing, and any commentator wrestling with Kant's views on the self would do well to consider carefully Melnick's contribution to the literature. - Colin Marshall, New York University, USA Author InformationArthur Melnick is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has published several books on Kant’s philosophy including Space, Time, and Thought in Kant, and Themes in Kant’s Metaphysics and Ethics. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |