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OverviewJustification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core internalist intuitions without construing justification as an internal condition knowable by reflection alone. Sven Rosenkranz conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing and of being in a position to know. His account contrasts with recent alternative views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. Instead, he develops a suitable non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and being in a position to know that respects the finding that these notions create hyperintensional contexts. He also defends his conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and provides a metaphysics of justification and its varying degrees of strength that is compatible with core assumptions of the knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental states. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Sven Rosenkranz (ICREA Research Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Barcelona)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 15.90cm , Height: 2.20cm , Length: 24.10cm Weight: 0.606kg ISBN: 9780198865636ISBN 10: 0198865635 Pages: 304 Publication Date: 09 March 2021 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order ![]() Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of ContentsPreface 1: Outline of a Theory of Justification 2: Principles of Epistemic Logic I: Knowledge 3: On Being in a Position to Know 4: Principles of Epistemic Logic II: Being in a Position to Know 5: Two Systems of Epistemic Logic 6: Propositional and Doxastic Justification 7: Applications 8: Competing Views 9: Grounds for Justification 10: What's Wrong with Internalism? Concluding Remarks Appendix: The Luminosity of Some Non-Trivial ConditionReviewsRosenkranz is meticulous in laying the groundwork of a theory. He establishes that propositional justification is a feature of one's epistemic situation, rather than of one's beliefs, hence nonfactive. He further develops a multimodal epistemic logic to show that the luminosity of propositional justification entails the luminosity of doxastic justification. * L. A. Wilkinson, CHOICE Connect, Vol. 59 No. 8 * Author InformationSven Rosenkranz is ICREA Research Professor at the University of Barcelona. Since 2014 he has been coordinator of the consolidated research group in analytic philosophy LOGOS, and from 2019 until 2021 serves as PI of the research project 'Justification, its Structure and Grounds'. In 2018 he was elected member of the Academia Europaea. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |