Overview

A definitive account of the American experience in Afghanistan from the rise of the Taliban to the depths of the insurgency. Longtime Afghanistan expert and RAND analyst Seth G. Jones watched as American optimism evaporated after the Taliban defeat in 2001; by 2005, a new war of a thousand cuts had brought Afghanistan to its knees. Harnessing important new historical research on insurgencies and integrating thousands of declassified government documents, Jones shows how the siphoning of resources to Iraq left U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan ineffectual and without support. Through interviews with prominent figures, including ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and commander Karl Eikenberry, Jones explains how a growing sanctuary for insurgents in Pakistan and a collapsing government in Kabul catalyzed the Taliban resurgence. Examining what has worked thus far -- and what hasn't -- Jones argues that we must take a radically new approach to the war if the United States is to avoid the disastrous fate that has befallen every world power to enter the region, from Alexander the Great to the Soviet Union.

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A useful and generally lively account of what can go wrong when outsiders venture onto the Afghan landscape. Those ventures have generally not turned out well This is ominous, because [Jones] knows too much about recent interventions for his pessimism to be disregarded. --Steven Simon

A scholarly account of America's unsuccessful effort to avoid the same fate as three other great powers who tried to tame Afghanistan.RAND political scientist Jones (Foreign Service/Georgetown Univ.; The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 2007) begins by describing the failures of Alexander the Great, Victorian Britain and the Soviet Union, reminding readers that the United States missed its first opportunity in the area after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Delighted at humiliating our Cold War enemy, American forces withdrew, well-armed Afghan factions turned on each other and the nation descended into lawless chaos. Some semblance of order returned in the '90s when the Taliban conquered most of the country and established an oppressive Islamic regime. In 2001, enraged at its refusal to surrender Osama bin Laden, U.S. forces attacked the country and aided Taliban opponents, who triumphed in a few months. At this point, Jones slows to deliver a blow-by-blow account of how America squandered this victory. As fighting died down, U.S. leaders turned their attention to an invasion of Iraq. During several relatively peaceful postwar years, Afghanistan made progress in establishing a constitutional government, improving education and rebuilding infrastructure. Unfortunately, it never achieved a stable government's primary duty - providing security. Police and officials remained ineffective and corrupt and warlords and criminals reclaimed their turf. The chaos that followed the Soviet withdrawal returned - along with the Taliban and other insurgencies, rested and rejuvenated in Pakistan. Jones admits that America is trying to correct its mistake but rightly wonders if the government will be able to devote as much effort, time and money as was devoted to a similar mistake - not yet corrected - in Iraq.An impressively researched, often grueling illustration of how U.S. leaders failed - once again - to learn from experience. (Kirkus Reviews)

A useful and generally lively account of what can go wrong when outsiders venture onto the Afghan landscape. Those ventures have generally not turned out well...This is ominous, because [Jones] knows too much about recent interventions for his pessimism to be disregarded. -- Steven Simon

History justifies Jones's worries Jones may have written a blueprint for winning in a region that has historically brought mighty armies to their knees.--Doug Childers

Gauging whether the US and its allies can succeed in Afghanistan is only part of what Jones s excellent book is about. --James Blitz

Author Information

Seth G. Jones is the senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as well as the author of Three Dangerous Men, A Covert Action, In the Graveyard of Empires, and Hunting in the Shadows. He lives outside of Washington, DC.

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