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OverviewMarkus Berndt explains the observable evolution and persistence of differences in financial systems by elaborating on the influence of network effects on corporate governance systems. He develops a coherent theoretical framework pulling together existing agency theories and providing new theoretical foundations wherever there is a gap in the current theoretical understanding of corporate governance. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Markus BerndtPublisher: Deutscher Universitats-Verlag Imprint: Deutscher Universitats-Verlag Edition: 2002 ed. Dimensions: Width: 14.80cm , Height: 0.80cm , Length: 21.00cm Weight: 0.262kg ISBN: 9783824476947ISBN 10: 3824476940 Pages: 143 Publication Date: 30 August 2002 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print ![]() This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Language: German Table of Contents1. Introduction.- 2. Differences in Corporate Governance Systems.- 2.1 Components of a Corporate Governance System - Scope of the Analysis.- 2.2 Empirical Evidence.- 2.3 Explanations for the Evolution of Different Systems.- 2.4 Explanations for the Persistence of Different Systems.- 3. Analytical Framework.- 3.1 Purpose of Corporate Governance.- 3.2 The Role of Institutions and Law.- 4. Dispersed Control - the Outsider System.- 4.1 Takeover Market and the Agency Costs of Dispersed Control.- 4.2 Institutional Innovation.- 4.3 A Case for Mandatory Disclosure.- 5. Concentrated Control - the Insider System.- 5.1 Differences with Dispersed Control.- 5.2 Modeling the Reputation Mechanism of Concentrated Control.- 5.3 Implications.- 5.4 Legislative Intervention.- 6. Network Effects via Capital Markets.- 6.1 Influence of Corporate Governance on Capital Market Liquidity.- 6.2 The Influence of Capital Market Liquidity on Corporate Governance.- 6.3 Resulting Network Effects.- 7. Evolutionary Model.- 7.1 Intention and Structure.- 7.2 Setup.- 7.3 Control Strategy.- 7.4 Legislation and Financial System.- 8. Implications for Corporate Governance Reforms.- 8.1 Sequencing of Reforms.- 8.2 Hysteresis of Inefficient Systems.- 8.4 An Outlook on Privatization Strategies.- 9. The Influence of Coordination Benefits on Corporate Governance and Accounting Standards.- 9.1 Objective of this Chapter.- 9.2 Setup.- 9.3 Equilibria.- 9.4 Social Welfare.- 9.5 Implications of the Coordination Model.- 10. Conclusion.- Appendix: Difference between Entry-Inducement and Entry-Deterrence -A Theoretical Note.- References.ReviewsAuthor Information"Dr. Markus Berndt promovierte bei Prof. Dr. Manfred J. Holler im Rahmen des Graduiertenkollegs für ""Recht und Ökonomik"" der Universität Hamburg. Er ist Referent am Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung in Bonn." Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |