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OverviewGame theory is useful in understanding collective human activity as the outcome of interactive decisions. In recent years it has become a more prominent aspect of research and applications in public policy disciplines such as economics, philosophy, management and political science, and in work within public policy itself. Here Roger McCain makes use of the analytical tools of game theory with the pragmatic purpose of identifying problems and exploring potential solutions in public policy. In practice, the influence of game theory on public policy and related disciplines has been less a consequence of broad theorems than of insightful examples. Accordingly, the author offers a critical review of major topics from both cooperative and noncooperative game theory, including less-known ideas in noncooperative game theory and constructive proposals for new approaches. In so doing, he provides a toolkit for the analysis of public policy as well as a clearer understanding of the public policy enterprise itself. The author's unique approach and treatment of game theory will be a useful resource for students and scholars of economics and public policy, as well as for policymakers themselves. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Roger A. McCainPublisher: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Imprint: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd ISBN: 9781849805711ISBN 10: 1849805717 Pages: 272 Publication Date: 29 October 2010 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Out of Print Availability: Awaiting stock ![]() Table of ContentsContents: Part I: Historical and Critical Survey 1. Objectives and Scope of the Book 2. Representing Games 3. A Brief Interpretive History of Game Theory 4. Nash Equilibrium and Public Policy 5. Correlated Equilibrium 6. Non-cooperative Sequential Games and Public Policy 7. Social Mechanism Design 8. Superadditive Games in Coalition Function Form 9. Imperfect Recall and Aggregation of Strategies 10. Strategy, Externality, and Rationality Part II: Encapsulated Cooperation 11. Coalition Formation and Stability 12. Bargaining, Weak Dynamics, and Consensus 13. Formal Aspects of Games in Partition Function Form 14. Coalitional Play 15. The Government Game 16. Toward Political Economy References IndexReviews'... the McCain book is a thoughtful and thought-provoking survey of the post-war game theoretic literature. It is notable for its clear exposition, its willingness to acknowledge weaknesses and ambiguities of game theory, and its many illustrations. It would make an excellent text for students who have already learned a bit of game theory in earlier classes and who are open to broader issues than those covered in more mathematical and more elementary books. It is also good bedtime reading for academics who use a bit of game theory in their own work and for theorists who are interested in methodological issues associated with rational choice models.' -- Roger D. Congleton, Public Administration Author InformationRoger A. McCain, Professor, School of Economics, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, US Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |