Overview

Key environmental issues, such as biodiversity and climate change, have in recent years become more pressing than ever. Where the critical papers in the early 1990s explained the difficulties of cooperation in tackling transboundary environmental problems, later works have analyzed the various alternatives, and increased our understanding of various institutional designs and negotiation protocols' impact on the success of cooperation. This collection brings together the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements.

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9781782545095

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'As the nations of the world struggle to negotiate an effective post-Kyoto international climate agreement, there is no area of economic scholarship that has more to offer than game theory. Michael Finus and Alejandro Caparros, themselves leading scholars in this realm, have assembled a dream team of authors and a remarkable set of key articles from the best economics journals to produce a book with close to 50 chapters that should be essential reading for novices as well as experienced researchers' - Robert Stavins, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, US

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Edited by Michael Finus, Department of Economics, Universitat Graz, Austria and Alejandro Caparros, Associate Research Professor, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC), and Deputy Director, Institute for Public Goods and Policies, Spain

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