Overview

By the summer of 1944, the war in Europe had reached a critical point. Both the western Allies and the Soviets possessed the initiative and forces capable of mounting strategic offensives against the German enemy. Writing a study of operations on first the Western then Eastern Front, respected military analyst C. J. Dick offers rare insight into the strengths and weaknesses of generalship on both fronts, especially the judgments, choices, and compromises made by senior commanders. At the same time, he clarifies the constraints imposed upon leadership-and upon operations-by doctrinal shortcomings, by logistics, and, not least, by the nature of coalition war. From Victory to Stalemate focuses on the Western Front, specifically American, British, and Canadian operations in France and the Low Countries. Dick's lens throughout is operational art, which links individual tactical battles to broader strategic aims. Beginning with the D-Day landings in Normandy and the strengths and weaknesses of the armies, including their military doctrines, Dick goes on to analyze the offensives launched in the high summer of 1944. He considers the strategic factors and plans that provide the context for his main concern: the Allied commanders' handling of army, army group, and theatre offensive operations. Dick's analysis shows us an Allied command limited by thinking that is firmly rooted in the experience of small wars and the World War I. The resulting incremental approach was further complicated by a divergence in the ideas and interests of the Allied forces. The man responsible for pulling it all together, Dwight D. Eisenhower, proved remarkably capable in his role as statesman; he was to be less effective as a military technician who could govern such difficult subordinates as Bradley and Montgomery. As a result, the Allied offensive faltered and became a war of attrition, in contrast to the Soviet effort on the Eastern Front.

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The operational level of war occupies the middle ground between the tactical and the strategic. The practical conduct of warfare at that level is called operational art. While tactics and strategy have been understood for centuries, the principles of the operational art only began to emerge at the very end of the 18th century. As a distinct body of warfighting practices and skills, it was slow to be accepted and understood by many armies, especially the American and British. Yet, the generals of the World War II Western Allies fought campaigns on the operational level without the benefit of an established doctrine. Those campaigns were successful on balance, but they were flawed and less than optimal. Nonetheless, the Allies won the war. In his penetrating and lucid analysis of the campaign from Normandy to the Rhine Charles J. Dick examines how that happened. David T. Zabecki Major General U.S. Army (Ret.), author of The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War

Charles Dick, formerly a senior lecturer at the Soviet Studies Research Center and senior fellow at the Defence Academy of the UK, proves to be a stellar author as well as instructor, and readers will surely learn a great deal from his book, in which the protagonists don't always receive passing grades. Fortunately for the GPAs of avid students of the war, the harsh marks handed out during this dazzling tour de force are reserved exclusively for Allied generals who ran the campaign on the western front during the summer of 1944."" - Bill Stone, Stone & Stone

The operational level of war occupies the middle ground between the tactical and the strategic. The practical conduct of warfare at that level is called operational art. While tactics and strategy have been understood for centuries, the principles of the operational art only began to emerge at the very end of the 18th century. As a distinct body of warfighting practices and skills, it was slow to be accepted and understood by many armies, especially the American and British. Yet, the generals of the World War II Western Allies fought campaigns on the operational level without the benefit of an established doctrine. Those campaigns were successful on balance, but they were flawed and less than optimal. Nonetheless, the Allies won the war. In his penetrating and lucid analysis of the campaign from Normandy to the Rhine Charles J. Dick examines how that happened. <b>David T. Zabecki Major General U.S. Army (Ret.)</b>, author of <i>The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War</i>

Author Information

C. J. Dick served in the British Army. After, he worked as a senior lecturer at the Soviet Studies Research Centre, which he directed from 1989-2004. From 2005-2006, he was a senior fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.

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