Overview
Freedom and Responsibility in Context argues for a contextualist account of freedom and moral responsibility. It aims to challenge the largely unarticulated orthodoxy of invariantism, by arguing that contextualism is crucial to an understanding of both freedom and moral responsibility. The argument for contextualism regarding freedom and moral responsibility focuses upon their respective control conditions. Abilities are argued to be central to an understanding of the control required for freedom and moral responsibility. A unified, ability analysis of control is developed, which supports the thesis that attributions of freedom and moral responsibility are context dependent. The resulting contextualism offers a rapprochement of compatibilism and incompatibilism. By going beyond the false dichotomy of invariant compatibilism and invariant incompatibilism, it is argued that both positions can be given their due, since there is no 'right' answer to the question of whether or not determinism undermines freedom and moral responsibility.
Full Product Details
Author: Ann Whittle (Lecturer, Lecturer, Philosophy Department, University of Manchester)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Imprint: Oxford University Press
Dimensions:
Width: 16.50cm
, Height: 2.00cm
, Length: 24.20cm
Weight: 0.542kg
ISBN: 9780192845603
ISBN 10: 0192845608
Pages: 256
Publication Date: 28 October 2021
Audience:
Professional and scholarly
,
Professional & Vocational
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active
Availability: To order
Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us.
Reviews
The book is packed full of arguments and engagement with other thinkers, and covers a wide range of topics, including various forms of the Consequence Argument, both compatibilist and incompatibilist views of freedom, and the context-sensitivity of claims about knowledge, causation, and prevention. Yet Whittle is also careful, conscious of the limitations of the arguments presented, and aware of exactly what claims she needs to arrive at her main conclusions. And for seemingly every major claim, she provides multiple, independent arguments and thorough discussion of objections. * Gabriel De Marco, Criminal Law and Philosophy *
Author Information
Ann Whittle is Lecturer in the Philosophy Department at the University of Manchester where she has been since 2007. She studied at Oxford (BA) and University College London (MPhil and PhD). After her PhD, she was a Jacobsen Research Fellow at the University of London and then a lecturer at Trinity and Churchill Colleges, Cambridge). Her main areas of interest are Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, and Ethics. She is interested in how our agency can be accommodated in the natural world and her recent research has focused on the area of abilities, freedom, and moral responsibility.
