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OverviewFull Product DetailsAuthor: Alex Stein (Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 16.20cm , Height: 2.00cm , Length: 24.20cm Weight: 0.545kg ISBN: 9780198257363ISBN 10: 0198257368 Pages: 264 Publication Date: 25 August 2005 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order ![]() Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of ContentsACKNOWLEDGEMENTS; PREFACE; I. GROUNDWORK; II. EPISTEMOLOGICAL COROLLARY; III. UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF EVIDENCE THROUGH PARADOXES OF RATIONAL BELIEF; IV. EVIDENCE LAW: WHAT IS IT FOR?; V. COST-EFFICIENCY; VI. ALLOCATION OF THE RISK OF ERROR IN CRIMINAL TRIALS; VII. ALLOCATION OF THE RISK OF ERROR IN CIVIL LITIGATIONReviews`the most provocative of evidence books ... constitutes the most sophisticated and persuasive argument for enormously enhanced legal control over the evidentiary process in recent memory, and stands in marked contrast to the progression of the law of evidence in the Anglo-American world...Foundational to [Stein>'s] call for intense control over the evidentiary process is his deep insight that rules of evidence do not just do what they purport to do; they also allocate error, like it or not. He is right on this point... [he] articulates an elegant unified theory of evidence law ... From these theoretical perspectives, he brilliantly critiques various evidentiary rules...[and] provides a creative theoretical foundation for both civil and criminal litigation. ' Ronald J. Allen, 27 Law & Philosophy (2008) `Without sharing all positions of Prof. Stein ... one has to salute the effort accomplished to prevent the law of evidence from oozing away in the lazy folds of the Cartesian spirit. ' Rafael Encinas de Munagorri, 2-2007 Revue Internationale de Droit Compare 457 (in French) `Alex Stein may be the Ronald Dworkin of evidence law. Foundations of Evidence Law ... offers an alternative to Bentham's influential evidentiary views...Like Dworkin's theory of law generally, Stein attempts to locate and justify the law of evidence within the domain of political morality, that is, to legitimate and justify the coercive state authority that the law of evidence helps to initiate. [The] foundations that Stein articulates seek to describe and explain... Anglo-American evidentiary practices in light of a few broad principles that in turn justify the practices in terms of political morality...a significant book [that] offers unique and powerful arguments regarding virtually every important evidentiary issue, and it pushes the debates regarding these issues forward. ' Michael S. Pardo in 5(2) International Commentary on Evidence (2007) `Foundations of Evidence Law ... represents an important first attempt to base evidence doctrine on something more than armchair psychology, to provide a justification for and conceptual unity to what has hitherto been regarded as an incoherent patchwork of historical hangovers from outdated assumptions about fact-finding, and to make clear the value of probability theory. As such, it deserves to be read and engaged with by all evidence scholars, whether interested in evidence law alone or more widely in the processes of proof.' Donald Nicolson, Legal Studies `...Although this book contains much that is challenging and controversial, there can be little doubt that it is one of the most significant and stimulating monographs on evidence law to have been published in recent years. ' Roderick Bagshaw, Law Quarterly Review 168, 172, 2007 `[Foundations of Evidence Law] attempt[s] the monumental task of combining the contributions of the New Evidence Scholarship with those of doctrinal evidence lawyers and those who see evidence as encapsulating social values. Even works of partial synthesis are rarely encountered, and so Stein is to be congratulated on not only making an attempt to square the whole circle, but on making such a credible attempt. ... Stein has provided us with an extremely thoughtful and thought-provoking theory of evidence law. Both his objective and his conclusions are bold, and the reader is forced at every stage in the argument to consider whether she accepts the line that Stein takes, and why. Even if one does not accept that Stein's theory is uniquely correct, it is difficult not to accept that it is at least valid. ' Deirdre M. Dwyer, 5 Law, Probability and Risk 75 at 79 & 85 (2006). `the most provocative of evidence books ... constitutes the most sophisticated and persuasive argument for enormously enhanced legal control over the evidentiary process in recent memory, and stands in marked contrast to the progression of the law of evidence in the Anglo-American world...Foundational to [Stein's] call for intense control over the evidentiary process is his deep insight that rules of evidence do not just do what they purport to do; they also allocate error, like it or not. He is right on this point... [he] articulates an elegant unified theory of evidence law ... From these theoretical perspectives, he brilliantly critiques various evidentiary rules...[and] provides a creative theoretical foundation for both civil and criminal litigation. ' Ronald J. Allen, 27 Law & Philosophy (2008) `Without sharing all positions of Prof. Stein ... one has to salute the effort accomplished to prevent the law of evidence from oozing away in the lazy folds of the Cartesian spirit. ' Rafael Encinas de Munagorri, 2-2007 Revue Internationale de Droit Compare 457 (in French) `Alex Stein may be the Ronald Dworkin of evidence law. Foundations of Evidence Law ... offers an alternative to Bentham's influential evidentiary views...Like Dworkin's theory of law generally, Stein attempts to locate and justify the law of evidence within the domain of political morality, that is, to legitimate and justify the coercive state authority that the law of evidence helps to initiate. [The] foundations that Stein articulates seek to describe and explain... Anglo-American evidentiary practices in light of a few broad principles that in turn justify the practices in terms of political morality...a significant book [that] offers unique and powerful arguments regarding virtually every important evidentiary issue, and it pushes the debates regarding these issues forward. ' Michael S. Pardo in 5(2) International Commentary on Evidence (2007) `Foundations of Evidence Law ... represents an important first attempt to base evidence doctrine on something more than armchair psychology, to provide a justification for and conceptual unity to what has hitherto been regarded as an incoherent patchwork of historical hangovers from outdated assumptions about fact-finding, and to make clear the value of probability theory. As such, it deserves to be read and engaged with by all evidence scholars, whether interested in evidence law alone or more widely in the processes of proof.' Donald Nicolson, Legal Studies `...Although this book contains much that is challenging and controversial, there can be little doubt that it is one of the most significant and stimulating monographs on evidence law to have been published in recent years. ' Roderick Bagshaw, Law Quarterly Review 168, 172, 2007 `[Foundations of Evidence Law] attempt[s] the monumental task of combining the contributions of the New Evidence Scholarship with those of doctrinal evidence lawyers and those who see evidence as encapsulating social values. Even works of partial synthesis are rarely encountered, and so Stein is to be congratulated on not only making an attempt to square the whole circle, but on making such a credible attempt. ... Stein has provided us with an extremely thoughtful and thought-provoking theory of evidence law. Both his objective and his conclusions are bold, and the reader is forced at every stage in the argument to consider whether she accepts the line that Stein takes, and why. Even if one does not accept that Stein's theory is uniquely correct, it is difficult not to accept that it is at least valid. ' Deirdre M. Dwyer, 5 Law, Probability and Risk 75 at 79 & 85 (2006). "`the most provocative of evidence books ... constitutes the most sophisticated and persuasive argument for enormously enhanced legal control over the evidentiary process in recent memory, and stands in marked contrast to the progression of the law of evidence in the Anglo-American world...Foundational to [Stein's] call for intense control over the evidentiary process is his deep insight that rules of evidence do not just do what they purport to do; they also allocate error, like it or not. He is right on this point... [he] articulates an elegant unified theory of evidence law ... From these theoretical perspectives, he brilliantly critiques various evidentiary rules...[and] provides a creative theoretical foundation for both civil and criminal litigation. ' Ronald J. Allen, 27 Law & Philosophy (2008) `Without sharing all positions of Prof. Stein ... one has to salute the effort accomplished to prevent the law of evidence from oozing away in the lazy folds of the Cartesian spirit. ' Rafael Encinas de Munagorri, 2-2007 Revue Internationale de Droit Compare 457 (in French) `Alex Stein may be the Ronald Dworkin of evidence law. Foundations of Evidence Law ... offers an alternative to Bentham's influential evidentiary views...Like Dworkin's theory of law generally, Stein attempts to locate and justify the law of evidence within the domain of political morality, that is, to legitimate and justify the coercive state authority that the law of evidence helps to initiate. [The] ""foundations"" that Stein articulates seek to describe and explain... Anglo-American evidentiary practices in light of a few broad principles that in turn justify the practices in terms of political morality...a significant book [that] offers unique and powerful arguments regarding virtually every important evidentiary issue, and it pushes the debates regarding these issues forward. ' Michael S. Pardo in 5(2) International Commentary on Evidence (2007) `Foundations of Evidence Law ... represents an important first attempt to base evidence doctrine on something more than armchair psychology, to provide a justification for and conceptual unity to what has hitherto been regarded as an incoherent patchwork of historical hangovers from outdated assumptions about fact-finding, and to make clear the value of probability theory. As such, it deserves to be read and engaged with by all evidence scholars, whether interested in evidence law alone or more widely in the processes of proof.' Donald Nicolson, Legal Studies `...Although this book contains much that is challenging and controversial, there can be little doubt that it is one of the most significant and stimulating monographs on evidence law to have been published in recent years. ' Roderick Bagshaw, Law Quarterly Review 168, 172, 2007 `[Foundations of Evidence Law] attempt[s] the monumental task of combining the contributions of the New Evidence Scholarship with those of doctrinal evidence lawyers and those who see evidence as encapsulating social values. Even works of partial synthesis are rarely encountered, and so Stein is to be congratulated on not only making an attempt to square the whole circle, but on making such a credible attempt. ... Stein has provided us with an extremely thoughtful and thought-provoking theory of evidence law. Both his objective and his conclusions are bold, and the reader is forced at every stage in the argument to consider whether she accepts the line that Stein takes, and why. Even if one does not accept that Stein's theory is uniquely correct, it is difficult not to accept that it is at least valid. ' Deirdre M. Dwyer, 5 Law, Probability and Risk 75 at 79 & 85 (2006)." the most provocative of evidence books ... constitutes the most sophisticated and persuasive argument for enormously enhanced legal control over the evidentiary process in recent memory, and stands in marked contrast to the progression of the law of evidence in the Anglo-American world...Foundational to [Stein>'s] call for intense control over the evidentiary process is his deep insight that rules of evidence do not just do what they purport to do; they also allocate error, like it or not. He is right on this point... [he] articulates an elegant unified theory of evidence law ... From these theoretical perspectives, he brilliantly critiques various evidentiary rules...[and] provides a creative theoretical foundation for both civil and criminal litigation. Ronald J. Allen, 27 Law & Philosophy (2008) Without sharing all positions of Prof. Stein ... one has to salute the effort accomplished to prevent the law of evidence from oozing away in the lazy folds of the Cartesian spirit. Rafael Encinas de Munagorri, 2-2007 Revue Internationale de Droit Compare 457 (in French) Alex Stein may be the Ronald Dworkin of evidence law. Foundations of Evidence Law ... offers an alternative to Bentham's influential evidentiary views...Like Dworkin's theory of law generally, Stein attempts to locate and justify the law of evidence within the domain of political morality, that is, to legitimate and justify the coercive state authority that the law of evidence helps to initiate. [The] foundations that Stein articulates seek to describe and explain... Anglo-American evidentiary practices in light of a few broad principles that in turn justify the practices in terms of political morality...a significant book [that] offers unique and powerful arguments regarding virtually every important evidentiary issue, and it pushes the debates regarding these issues forward. Michael S. Pardo in 5(2) International Commentary on Evidence (2007) Foundations of Evidence Law ... represents an important first attempt to base evidence doctrine on something more than armchair psychology, to provide a justification for and conceptual unity to what has hitherto been regarded as an incoherent patchwork of historical hangovers from outdated assumptions about fact-finding, and to make clear the value of probability theory. As such, it deserves to be read and engaged with by all evidence scholars, whether interested in evidence law alone or more widely in the processes of proof. Donald Nicolson, Legal Studies ...Although this book contains much that is challenging and controversial, there can be little doubt that it is one of the most significant and stimulating monographs on evidence law to have been published in recent years. Roderick Bagshaw, Law Quarterly Review 168, 172, 2007 [Foundations of Evidence Law] attempt[s] the monumental task of combining the contributions of the New Evidence Scholarship with those of doctrinal evidence lawyers and those who see evidence as encapsulating social values. Even works of partial synthesis are rarely encountered, and so Stein is to be congratulated on not only making an attempt to square the whole circle, but on making such a credible attempt. ... Stein has provided us with an extremely thoughtful and thought-provoking theory of evidence law. Both his objective and his conclusions are bold, and the reader is forced at every stage in the argument to consider whether she accepts the line that Stein takes, and why. Even if one does not accept that Stein's theory is uniquely correct, it is difficult not to accept that it is at least valid. Deirdre M. Dwyer, 5 Law, Probability and Risk 75 at 79 & 85 (2006). Author InformationAlex Stein is Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |