Forgotten Legions: German Army Infantry Policy 1918-1941

Author:   Samuel Lewis
Publisher:   Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
ISBN:  

9780275902353


Pages:   223
Publication Date:   15 October 1985
Recommended Age:   From 7 to 17 years
Format:   Hardback
Availability:   Manufactured on demand   Availability explained
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Forgotten Legions: German Army Infantry Policy 1918-1941


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Author:   Samuel Lewis
Publisher:   Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Imprint:   Praeger Publishers Inc
Dimensions:   Width: 14.00cm , Height: 1.80cm , Length: 21.00cm
Weight:   0.454kg
ISBN:  

9780275902353


ISBN 10:   0275902358
Pages:   223
Publication Date:   15 October 1985
Recommended Age:   From 7 to 17 years
Audience:   College/higher education ,  General/trade ,  Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly ,  General
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   Manufactured on demand   Availability explained
We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier.

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Reviews

?Lewis's book is not another sentimental treatment of doomed soldiers and megalomaniacal generals but a hardheaded, sure-handed analysis of developments in the German Army from the end of WW I to 1941. Lewis details changes in weaponry, training, and organization of troops. He discusses the debate within the German General Staff on the proper place of armored vehicles and mobile infantry, the effects of Hitler's increasingly direct intrusion into military planning, and other subjects great and small. Along the way he passes a few harsh but well-considered judgments on Basil Liddell Hart and Heinz Guderian, for too long the unquestioned authorities on several of the above topics. Lewis also defends the General Staff against charges of stodgy conservatism, attributing the Wehrmacht's lack of preparedness of WW II to Hitler's reckess expansion of the army and his confused economic priorities. In purely military matters the book is well grounded in the German and English source materials, It is less reliable, but by no means shoddy, when dealing with the intricate larger context of military developments. In its major concerns the work is excellent, free from military jargon, and accessible to the nonexpert reader. Libraries at all levels.?-Choice Lewis's book is not another sentimental treatment of doomed soldiers and megalomaniacal generals but a hardheaded, sure-handed analysis of developments in the German Army from the end of WW I to 1941. Lewis details changes in weaponry, training, and organization of troops. He discusses the debate within the German General Staff on the proper place of armored vehicles and mobile infantry, the effects of Hitler's increasingly direct intrusion into military planning, and other subjects great and small. Along the way he passes a few harsh but well-considered judgments on Basil Liddell Hart and Heinz Guderian, for too long the unquestioned authorities on several of the above topics. Lewis also defends the General Staff against charges of stodgy conservatism, attributing the Wehrmacht's lack of preparedness of WW II to Hitler's reckess expansion of the army and his confused economic priorities. In purely military matters the book is well grounded in the German and English source materials, It is less reliable, but by no means shoddy, when dealing with the intricate larger context of military developments. In its major concerns the work is excellent, free from military jargon, and accessible to the nonexpert reader. Libraries at all levels. -Choice


?Lewis's book is not another sentimental treatment of doomed soldiers and megalomaniacal generals but a hardheaded, sure-handed analysis of developments in the German Army from the end of WW I to 1941. Lewis details changes in weaponry, training, and organization of troops. He discusses the debate within the German General Staff on the proper place of armored vehicles and mobile infantry, the effects of Hitler's increasingly direct intrusion into military planning, and other subjects great and small. Along the way he passes a few harsh but well-considered judgments on Basil Liddell Hart and Heinz Guderian, for too long the unquestioned authorities on several of the above topics. Lewis also defends the General Staff against charges of stodgy conservatism, attributing the Wehrmacht's lack of preparedness of WW II to Hitler's reckess expansion of the army and his confused economic priorities. In purely military matters the book is well grounded in the German and English source materials, It is less reliable, but by no means shoddy, when dealing with the intricate larger context of military developments. In its major concerns the work is excellent, free from military jargon, and accessible to the nonexpert reader. Libraries at all levels.?-Choice


Lewis's book is not another sentimental treatment of doomed soldiers and megalomaniacal generals but a hardheaded, sure-handed analysis of developments in the German Army from the end of WW I to 1941. Lewis details changes in weaponry, training, and organization of troops. He discusses the debate within the German General Staff on the proper place of armored vehicles and mobile infantry, the effects of Hitler's increasingly direct intrusion into military planning, and other subjects great and small. Along the way he passes a few harsh but well-considered judgments on Basil Liddell Hart and Heinz Guderian, for too long the unquestioned authorities on several of the above topics. Lewis also defends the General Staff against charges of stodgy conservatism, attributing the Wehrmacht's lack of preparedness of WW II to Hitler's reckess expansion of the army and his confused economic priorities. In purely military matters the book is well grounded in the German and English source materials, It is less reliable, but by no means shoddy, when dealing with the intricate larger context of military developments. In its major concerns the work is excellent, free from military jargon, and accessible to the nonexpert reader. Libraries at all levels. -Choice ?Lewis's book is not another sentimental treatment of doomed soldiers and megalomaniacal generals but a hardheaded, sure-handed analysis of developments in the German Army from the end of WW I to 1941. Lewis details changes in weaponry, training, and organization of troops. He discusses the debate within the German General Staff on the proper place of armored vehicles and mobile infantry, the effects of Hitler's increasingly direct intrusion into military planning, and other subjects great and small. Along the way he passes a few harsh but well-considered judgments on Basil Liddell Hart and Heinz Guderian, for too long the unquestioned authorities on several of the above topics. Lewis also defends the General Staff against charges of stodgy conservatism, attributing the Wehrmacht's lack of preparedness of WW II to Hitler's reckess expansion of the army and his confused economic priorities. In purely military matters the book is well grounded in the German and English source materials, It is less reliable, but by no means shoddy, when dealing with the intricate larger context of military developments. In its major concerns the work is excellent, free from military jargon, and accessible to the nonexpert reader. Libraries at all levels.?-Choice


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